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Abstract 
This paper examines the macroeconomic consequences of the 1976-80 coffee boom 
in Costa Rica. It first describes the nature and measures the extent of this positive, 
temporary trade shock, associated both with coffee price increases and a major improvement 
of the country's international terms of trade. It next explores the consequences of the 
resulting windfall on the components of aggregate demand and supply, on asset accumula-
tion, on employment, and on relative commodity prices. Finally, it evaluates macroeconomic 
policy management during the boom and the extent to which inappropriate policy decisions 
contributed to the fiscal and financial crisis of the early 1980s. It also attempts to identify 
the impact of both the trade shock and the policy responses on the country's long-term 
prospects for economic growth. 
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COSTA RICA: MISMANAGEMENT OF THE COFFEE BOOM1 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega2 
I. Introduction 
Costa Rica is a small, very open economy. With a total population of 2.6 million 
people, a per capita GDP of CR$ 77,250 (about US$ 1,540), and a total GDP of CR$ 198 
billion (about US$ 3,950 million), by 1985 the country's domestic market was still compara-
tively insignificant. Given a narrow resource base and a limiting domestic market, Costa 
Rica has always perceived that trade with other countries must act as the economy's engine 
of growth. Indeed, much of the impulse for growth during this century has been provided 
by the export of agricultural commodities. The development for export of coffee, bananas, 
cacao, sugar, and beef raised the levels of domestic output and income, increased the 
country's capacity to import, and yielded the dynamic benefits from specialization and 
competition. 
The result has been a very open economy. During the past three decades, exports 
have represented between one-fifth and over two-fifths of the GDP, while imports have 
amounted from one-quarter to almost one-half of the GDP. The importance of imports in-
1 Paper prepared for the Project on Temporary Trade Shocks, sponsored by the 
Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, and the World Bank. An 
earlier version was presented at the Conference on Temporary Trade Shocks, Oxford, 
September, 1990. 
2 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega is Professor of Agricultural Economics and of Economics at 
the Ohio State University. The author is grateful for the assistance of Juan Munoz 
and Luis Mesalles with data handling. Comments by David Bevan, Paul Collier, and 
Jan Gunning, who originated the methodology employed, and by Philip Brock are 
acknowledged. Responsibility remains solely with the author. 
1 
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creased to a peak of 48 percent in 1974, during the first oil shock. Costa Rica has exported 
mainly primary products, particularly coffee and bananas. About two-thirds of the agricul-
tural output have been exported, while these exports have generated about two-thirds of the 
country's export earnings. 
Trade played an important role in the development of the manufacturing sector, as 
well. Costa Rica joined the Central American Common Market (CACM) and adopted a 
strategy of regional import substitution in 1963. Manufactured goods, which represented 
only 4 percent of exports at that time, grew to 29 percent of the total in 1979, just before 
the breakdown of the CACM. About four-fifths of these exports went, however, to the 
protected markets in the partner countries in the regional customs union. In addition, a 
high reliance on foreign savings explained a good portion of the relatively high rates of 
capital accumulation and the corresponding high rates of output growth experienced through 
the 1970s, despite a comparatively poor performance of domestic savings. After the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s, and in response to changes in the commercial policy 
regime, exports of new non-traditional exports (pineapples and other tropical fruits, flowers 
and ornamentals, winter vegetables) have been the most dynamic sector of the Costa Rican 
economy. 
Macroeconomic events in this smaJ.l, very open economy have been dominated, there-
fore, by the evolution of its international economic relations: the demand for and the prices 
paid in foreign markets for its main export crops, the opportunities provided and the 
constraints imposed by its participation in the Central American Common Market, and its 
3 
degree of access to savings from abroad, in order to finance high rates of both consumption 
and domestic investment.3 
Prior to the mid-1970s, macroeconomic instability in Costa Rica had been a function, 
primarily, of fluctuations in the international prices of its two main exports: coffee and 
bananas, and of variations in the level of production of these two crops, in response to natu-
ral events and, more recently, due to labor unrest in the banana plantations. The country 
enjoyed, on the other hand, increasingly ample access to foreign savings, both to finance its 
brisk long-term growth and to facilitate the required balance-of-payments adjustments, when 
prices or yields became temporarily low, without an excessive reduction in employment and 
consumption. A comparatively small size of its public sector and the pursuit of cautious fis-
cal and monetary policies, under the leadership of a strong and independent Central Bank, 
had resulted in remarkable price and exchange rate stability, despite the country's inevitable 
vulnerability to external shocks. 
Mter 1973, however, Costa Rica experienced several major external shocks, namely, 
the two international oil crises4, the 1976 coffee boom, soon followed by a world recession, 
the breakdown of trade within the Central American Common Market, war, insurrection, 
and political turmoil in Central America, and sharp changes in its degree of access to 
international financial markets. This sequence of sizable external shocks, which took place 
3 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Costa Rica: Macroeconomic Policies. Crises, and Long-
Term Growth, monograph prepared for the World Bank Project on Macroeconomic 
Policies, Crises, and Long-Term Growth, 1989. 
4 The first oil shock required the first adjustment originated on the import, rather than 
the export side of the balance of payments, since World War II. 
4 
in a relatively short period of time, sharply increased the instability of the economy and 
magnified its problems of adjustment, while the comparatively successful tools for macroeco-
nomic management that the authorities had developed over the years were no longer 
appropriate to deal with the new situation. 
The structural rigidities that had resulted from the protectionist strategy of devel-
opment adopted in the late 1950s had created, in the meantime, an economic environment 
less conducive than in the past to a rapid and smooth adjustment. Contrary to its declared 
objective, import substitution had not reduced the country's dependence on its traditional 
agricultural exports, whose growth had facilitated, through the mid-1970s, the expansion of 
protected trade within the CACM. The cascading pattern of nominal protection, with high 
tariff rates on imports of final consumer goods, and low duties on imports of intermediate 
and capital goods, had fostered an import-intensive manufacturing sector and had imparted 
a strong anti-export bias to its development. Since the reductions of imports required after 
negative external shocks implied a diminished availability of inputs for production, the 
powerful manufacturing sector was able to block attempted adjustments, forcing an excessive 
increase in foreign borrowing. 
Powerful public sector labor unions prevented, in turn, the required reductions in 
government expenditures. These and similar political economy forces increasingly reduced 
the degrees of freedom of the authorities and explained, in part, the adoption of incomplete, 
inconsistent measures which magnified, rather than minimized, both the degree of macro-
economic instability and the extent of the adjustments required. These events led, in the 
early 1980s, to the crisis, a blown-up version of similar episodes of recurrent macroeconomic 
5 
difficulties, which intermittently resulted from the economy's vulnerability to changes in 
external market conditions, but which so far had been, in comparison, more easily manage-
able.5 
The 1974 oil crisis brought about a first major challenge of adjustment for the Costa 
Rican economy. This trade shock was faced by the authorities in the traditional way, with 
a rapid expansion of both domestic credit and foreign borrowing, in order to avoid too much 
of a reduction in aggregate expenditures. The magnitude of the required credit flows was 
much greater, however, than in earlier occasions, and a large increase in the country's 
external debt was not sufficient to prevent Costa Rica's first inflationary experience since 
the late 1940s. 
Domestic inflation was short-lived, however, because soon the coffee boom made it 
possible, once more, to divert excessive aggregate demand towards the balance of payments. 
When at the end of the coffee boom, once again the authorities attempted to smooth the 
process of adjustment by increasing foreign borrowing and expanding domestic credit, this 
time they were not successful. Two key issues from the experience of this period are, 
therefore, the importance of an adequate macroeconomic management during a boom, and 
the explanation of why Costa Rica failed in the implementation, during the early 1980s, of 
an adjustment strategy that had worked reasonably well in the past. While this paper 
s Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Fear of Adjusting: The Social Costs of Economic Policies 
in Costa Rica in the 1970s," in Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham, eds., 
Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribb¥an, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984. 
6 
focuses mostly on the first question, its findings shed some light on the second issue, as 
well.6 
The extent to which reliance on a few agricultural commodities for the generation 
of export earnings exposes an economy to the risk of market shocks has been amply dis-
cussed in the literature and in international forums. The available evidence suggests that 
world commodity markets have become more unstable and, possibly, more unpredictable 
since 1973, increasing risks, as indicated here for Costa Rica. This requires an improve-
ment, not only of macroeconomic policies, but of risk management techniques in the 
economy, as well? 
In order to deal with these temporary trade shocks, after 1973 Costa Rica heavily 
borrowed abroad. This strategy involved substantial risks in itself, too. An unexpected 
deterioration in the country's terms of trade, as was the case towards the end of the decade, 
can quickly erode a country's ability to service a large external debt, with major macro-
economic consequences.8 The resulting restricted access to new foreign loans has not only 
6 For a discussion of some of these issues, see Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Debt, Stabili-
zation, and liberalization in Costa Rica: Political Economy Responses to a Fiscal 
Crisis," in Philip L. Brock, Michael B. Connolly, and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, eds. 
Latin American Debt and Adjustment: External Shocks and Macroeconomic Policies, 
New York: Praeger, 1989, pp. 197-209. 
7 See Peter B. R. Hazell, "Risk, Market Failure and Agricultural Policy," paper 
presented at the S-180 conference on "An Economic Analysis of Risk Management 
Strategies for Agricultural Production Firms," Savannah, Georgia, March, 1988. In 
addition to the macroeconomic impacts, emphasized in the present paper, one has 
to be concerned with the microeconomic impacts on producers' incomes, risks, and 
investment and resource allocation decisions. 
8 See Robert J. Myers and Stanley R Thompson, "Optimal Portfolios of External Debt 
in Developing Countries: The Potential Role of Commodity-linked Bonds," Amer-
ican Journal of J\iricultural Economics, Vol. 71, No. 2, May, 1989, pp. 517-522. 
7 
imposed major adjustments on the Costa Rican economy and curtailed its growth opportuni-
ties, but it has also rendered a strategy of relying on foreign borrowing in the face of future 
negative trade shocks unfeasible. This has made the Costa Rican economy extremely more 
vulnerable. 
An analysis of Costa Rica's macroeconomic history in the second half of the 1970s 
presents major difficulties, in view of this multiplicity of exogenous shocks and of their 
overlapping (sometimes reinforcing, sometimes contradictory) consequences. Furthermore, 
any attempt to isolate the impact of the coffee boom from this complex sequence of events 
(the main purpose of this paper) has to rely on many heroic assumptions. Therefore, while 
the paper contains numerous computations, counterfactuals, and simulations, these are not 
expected to represent accurate measurements of actual impacts, but rather be merely indica-
tive of the direction of the influences of the coffee boom and of their approximate order of 
magnitude. Moreover, although the period is frequently described as the coffee boom, the 
prosperity that this expression refers to, and its consequences, go much beyond events in the 
coffee sector. 
The paper thus presents a preliminary exploration of a few basic questions. Did the 
coffee boom of 1976 contribute to the long-term growth of the Costa Rican economy? How 
were various sectors of the Costa Rican society affected by the boom? Did macroeconomic 
management (or mismanagement) of the boom made the crisis of the early 1980s even 
worse? What lessons can be learned from this experience, exceptional in its magnitude, but 
not alien to Costa Rica's past and future economic history? The paper attempts to provide 
provisional answers to some of these questions. It first describes the nature and extent of 
8 
the shock and measures the resulting windfall. Mter the construction of counterfactuals, it 
explores impacts on the components of aggregate demand and supply, on asset accumula-
tion, on employment, and on relative commodity prices. It analyzes the consequences of the 
policy decisions of the authorities and concludes with an interpretation of the lessons 
learned about acroeconomic management during a temporary trade shock. 
II. The Nature and Extent of the Shock 
2.1 The Coffee Boom 
On June 18, 1975 frost severely damaged about one-half of Brazil's 1976-77 coffee 
harvest. In addition, rain reduced the Colombian coffee crop by 20 percent and civil war 
disrupted Angola's production. This sharp reduction in the world's coffee supply 
dramatically increased prices, from their comparatively low 1975 levels (about US$ 50 per 
46 Kg. bag) to record levels (US$ 336 on Apri115, 1977 for the softs typically sold by Costa 
Rica). Although these high prices both discouraged consumption and stimulated production 
all over the world, with the accompanying price reductions, coffee remained unusually 
expensive for several years, partly in response to the producing countries' efforts to limit 
supply. On May 19, 1979 there was a new, although less severe, frost in Brazil, which 
further contributed to the high prices of the period. 
The annual average prices received by Costa Rican exporters during the second half 
of the decade are shown in Table 1. By 1977, these prices reached 3.8 times their 1975level 
and, although prices declined afterwards, by 1980 they still were 2.7 times that level. Even 
after taking into account the acceleration of international inflation, by 1980 a bag of coffee 
9 
could still buy twice as many imports as in 1975, when the price had been comparatively low. 
In effect, in 1975 the relative price of Costa Rican coffee has been at its lowest level since 
1950 and, for that reason, it was expected to rise (to about 1.5 times that level) even before 
news of the frost arrived. Had the price of coffee remained at US$ 58, over five years one 
bag would have generated US$ 290. The actual 1976-1980 earnings from a bag of coffee, 
on the other hand, amounted to 2.8 times that level (US$ 802) and generated excess 
earnings (a windfall) of US$ 512 per bag over those five years.9 
Table 1 
Costa Rica: Nominal and Real Coffee Prices, 1975-81 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Price aJ 58 110 217 167 149 159 115 
Price index 100 190 375 288 257 274 198 
rate of changeb' -9 90 97 -23 -11 7 -28 
Real pricecf 58 116 217 158 123 115 78 
Real price index 100 200 374 272 212 199 134 
rate of changeb' 43 100 87 -27 -22 -6 -32 
aJ Price per 46 Kg. bags in US dollars; annual average. 
bt Percentages. 
cl Prices in US dollars deflated by Costa Rica's import price index 
(1975:100) 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986. 
9 Since some increase in prices was actually expected, not all of these excess earnings 
are a true windfall. If the expected price would have been US$ 65, the correspond-
ing windfall would have been US$ 4 77 (about 60 percent of earnings), while with an 
expected price of US$ 90, the windfall would have been US$ 352 (about 45 percent 
of actual earnings). On the other hand, in real terms, deflated by the import price 
index, actual earnings amounted to 2.5 times the earnings of the period at constant 
coffee prices. 
10 
Costa Rica's coffee export earnings did not grow, in the beginning, as rapidly as inter-
national prices did, because of a substantially reduced quantum exported in 1976 and 1977 
(Table 2).10 This has been attributed to low levels of fertilization and other chemical 
inputs, in resonse to the low 1975 prices. Similarly, the new high prices stimulated a strong 
supply response (most of it with the inevitable two-year lag) for 1978 and 1979. While there 
was only a slight increase in the area planted, in view of policies to restrict supply, there 
were major yield improvements, as a result of the better agronomical practices induced by 
the boom. By 1979, yields were 23 percent higher than in 1975. 
Table 2 
Costa Rica: Volume and Value of Coffee Exports, Area Planted, and Yields. 
1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Exports Value11 97 154 319 314 316 248 
rate of growthb' -23 59 107 -2 1 -22 
Exports volumecJ 77 64 68 85 97 72 
rate of growthbl -15 -17 6 25 14 -26 
Area planted~ 84.6 85.2 85.8 86.4 87.0 87.6 
Yieldset 43 40 39 47 53 45 
1981 
240 
-3 
69 
-4 
88.1 
55 
rate of changebl -19 -7 -2 21 13 -15 22 
11 Millions of current US dollars. 
bt Percentages. 
cJ Millions of kilos. 
111 Thousands of hectares. 
et Double hecto-liters per hectare. 
Sources: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986; Oficina del 
Cafe; and United Stated Department of Agriculture, "World Coffee Situa-
tion," August, 1989. 
10 The exportable volume had rapidly grown from 69 million kilos in 1970 to 90 million 
kilos in 1974, a level that was not reached again until1979. In 1974 coffee exports 
amounted to US$ 125 million. 
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The smaller volume exported during the early years of the boom did not allow Costa 
Rica to take as much advantage of the high prices as would have been the case with a more 
typical crop. Increased production later on made it possible, on the other hand, to sustain 
the level of export earnings, despite the reduction in prices. The higher price obtained 
towards the end of the decade, furthermore, compensated for the new reduction in volume, 
in response to declining prices.11 This contributed to sustain a boom atmosphere, even 
after coffee prices had begun to drop. 
Table 3 
Costa Rica: Index of the Value, Volume, and Price of Coffee Exports. 
1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Export value index 100 159 330 324 326 256 248 
rate of changeat -22 59 108 -2 1 -21 -3 
Export volume index 100 84 88 112 127 93 126 
rate of changeat -15 -16 5 27 13 -27 34 
Export price index 100 190 375 288 257 274 198 
rate of changeat -9 90 97 -23 -11 7 -28 
at Percentages. 
Source: Computed from Table 1 and 2. 
Counterfactual coffee exports were estimated in order to measure the amount of the 
windfall generated by the coffee boom, under two basic assumptions: 
11 The quantum exported showed much less variability than both prices and revenues, 
while quantum and prices showed a positive, but very small correlation during each 
year. The variance of the logarithms was 0.212 for prices, 0.239 for value, and 0.023 
for quantum, while the covariance of price and quantum was 0.004, for 1975-80. 
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(a) the counterfactual volume of coffee exports would have been the same as the 
actual volume observed, and 
(b) all of the coffee price increases above the 1975 level represented a windfall. 
These assumptions had opposite consequences on the estimation of the windfall. On the 
one band, the actually observed volumes included a vigorous boom-induced supply response. 
Although not all of the increased production represented a windfall, since the extra output 
had an opportunity cost, in the absence of the price increases the exportable volume would 
have been less than observed. For this reason, the windfall was underestimated by this 
procedureP On the other hand, to the extent to which there were expectations that prices 
would rise, from their unusually low 1975 levels, the observed price increases in part 
represented a return to the trend and in part a true windfall. From this perspective, the 
second assumption leads to an overestimation of the unexpected windfall. The price changes 
were so sharp, in any case, that there is no doubt that a major windfall was earned. 
Over the five-year period (1976-1980), the total accumulated windfall amounted to 
US$ 862 million, as shown in Table 4 and in Figure 2. This was equivalent to the substan-
tial capital inflows of the previous decade. Indeed, between 1966 and 1975, the accumula-
tion of the capital account balances had added up to US$ 867 million. Moreover, the 
windfall was equivalent to more than one-and-a-half times the total outstanding balance 
(US$ 520 million) of Costa Rica's public external debt by 1975. 
12 This procedure was adopted, in addition, to make the results comparable to those 
obtained for Kenya by David Bevan, Paul Collier, and Jan W. Gunning, in Controlled 
Qpen ijconomies. A Neoclusical Al!proach :to Structuralism. Oxford: Oarendon 
Press, 1990, p. 143. 
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The acceleration of import prices towards the end of the 1970s (second oil shock) 
eroded, on the other hand, the real value of this coffee exports windfall, down to a total ac-
cumulated value of US$ 777 million at constant 1975 import prices. While this erosion was 
important only in 1979 and 1980, the behavior of the windfall, in real terms, reflected the 
opposite impact of still relatively high coffee prices and the new acceleration of import 
prices, which began to modify the prevailing structure of expectations. Furthermore, 
substantial access to international debt flows made it possible to sustain, in the face of a 
declining real value of the windfall, both the boom atmostphere and the level of aggregate 
expenditures. 
Table 4 
Costa Rica: Coffee Exports Windfall. 1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Coffee ExportsaJ 97 154 319 314 315 248 240 
rate of growthb' -23 59 107 -2 1 -21 -3 
Counterfactual Coffee ExportsaJ 97 81 85 109 123 90 121 
rate of growthb' -16 5 27 13 -27 34 
Windfall a! 0 73 234 205 193 158 119 
Real windfallc' 0 77 234 193 159 114 81 
Windfall as a proportion(%) of: 
Coffee exports 0 47 73 65 61 64 49 
Total exports 0 12 28 24 21 16 12 
GDP 0 3.0 7.6 5.8 4.8 3.6 3.6 
Real windfall/real GDpd' 0 3.7 10.4 8.1 6.3 4.5 3.3 
aJ Millions of US dollars. 
bl Percentages. 
cl Windfall in US dollars deflated by the Costa Rican import price index (1975:100). 
dl GDP in constant colones of 1975, windfall deflated by import price index. 
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The windfall represented a large proportion of total coffee exports: almost one-half 
in 1976, almost three-quarters in 1977, and almost two-thirds during the remaining years. 
It accounted, as well, for a large portion of each year's total exports of goods (28 percent 
in 1977) and of Gross Domestic Product (7.6 percent of GOP in 1977). At constant prices, 
the windfall was equivalent to over 10 percent of GDP in 1977, more than the annual rate 
of growth of output, and was similar to the relative importance of the Mexican oil boom.13 
As it had been the case throughout the country's history, coffee had a major impact on the 
Costa Rican economy still by the late 1970s. 
Table 5 
Costa Rica: Relative Importance of Coffee. 1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Shm:~ (%) af 'off~~ in: 
Exports 20 26 39 36 34 25 
Gross Value of Agricultural Output: 
Nominal 14 21 33 27 22 23 
Real11 19 18 19 20 19 21 
Value Added in Agriculture: 
Nominal 13 23 37 30 24 25 
Real11 20 20 20 22 22 23 
Gross Domestic Product: 
Nominal 2.6 4.7 8.3 6.1 4.5 4.5 
Real&' 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.5 
Tax Revenues 6.3 8.7 14.0 12.0 11.9 9.9 
11 At constant 1966 prices. 
b/ At constant 1975 prices. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986. 
13 See Michael Gavin, "The Mexican Oil Boom: 1975-1986," paper presented at the 
Conference on Temporary Trade Shocks, University of Oxford, September, 1990. 
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The importance of coffee in total exports had declined from 55 percent in 1958, to 
32 percent in 1970, and to the lowest observed value of 20 percent in 1975. Coffee's share 
of exports increased with the boom, as shown in Table 5, to over 39 percent in 1977, to a 
relative importance that it had not had since 1966. The share of coffee in the gross value 
of agricultural production more than doubled (to 33 percent in 1977), while its share in 
value added in the agricultural sector increased three times, to 37 percent at the peak of the 
boom. The relative importance of coffee in the generation of the GDP increased more than 
three times, from 2.6 percent in 1975 to 8.3 percent in 1977, when these shares are 
measured in nominal terms, since its relative importance in the absence of price changes 
hardly changed at all. Coffee taxes generated at least twice as large a share of Central 
Government tax revenues during the boom than during earlier periods. 
2.2 The Terms-of-Trade Shock 
Substantial as it was, the coffee boom was not the only macroeconomic event of the 
second half of the 1970s. The Costa Rican economy experienced several other exogenous, 
partially overlapping external shocks (including two oil crises, changes in the world markets 
for other major exports, a foreign debt boom, and civil war in Central America). All of 
these events simultaneously influenced expectations and decisions. A good indicator of 
these developments is the evolution of the country's international barter terms of trade, 
shown in Table 6 and in Figure 1. 
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Table 6 
Costa Rica: Export and Import Prices and Barter Terms of Trade. 1972~1982 
(Index 1975:100) 
Export Import Terms of Export Import Terms of 
Prices Prices Trade Pricesat Pricesbl Trade •,bt 
1972 65 60 108 
1973 73 67 110 
1974 88 91 96 
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1976 113 95 119 97 95 102 
1977 144 100 144 103 100 104 
1978 135 106 127 110 106 104 
1979 141 122 116 134 120 112 
1980 159 138 116 144 134 107 
1981 146 147 99 
1982 143 143 100 
at Exports without coffee. 
bt Imports without oil. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986. 
With the sharp increase in import (oil) prices in 1973 and 1974, Costa Rica's 
international terms of trade had deteriorated about 12 percent. This was followed by 
substantial improvements in 1975 through 1977, as a consequence of coffee and other export 
prices, and by a renewed deterioration afterwards, in view of declining coffee prices and new 
oil price increases. By 1977, the country's barter terms of trade were 44 percent above their 
1975 level and, despite their reduction, in 1980 they were still 16 percent above that level. 
By 1981, they had returned, however, to their 1975 level.14 
14 That is, the downturn was essentially a return to the average terms of trade, rather 
than the observation of an unusually low level of this relative price. The question 
then is how to manage an improvement that is not expected to last. 
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Figurel 
Costa Rica: Barter Tetms of Trade and Relative Coffee Prices. 
195&-1987. ( Index 1975:100). 
t\ 
I I 
I \ I \ 
I \ I~ \ I\ I 11 \ ,,, 
I \ I \ I I \ \ I 
'\ !\ I I I J ... "-J \ I v\_,/ 
\ 
- Terms of 'l'Jade 
-- Rd. Coffee Ptice 
o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
19S6 1959 1962 1965 19A 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 
The positive terms-of-trade shock lasted, therefore, from 1975 to 1981 (creating a 
well-defined five-year boom for 1976-1980). The boom was both preceded and followed 
(with a partial overlap) by major negative terms-of-trade shocks and it was, itself, the 
consequence of forces pulling in opposite directions. It was a period of prosperity, in any 
case, since during those five years, on the average export prices increased 1.39 times, while 
import prices increased only 1.12 times. It coincided, in addition, with major inflows of 
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foreign savings, that generated a parallel and complementary external debt boom. It is 
almost impossible to separate the consequences of these two booms.15 
This positive terms-of-trade shock was exceptional. The peak value of the index 
(144) reached in 1977 had not been observed for 20 years, since 1958 at the end of the 
Korean War boom. On the other hand, the 1974 level of the terms-of-trade index, after the 
first oil shock, had been the lowest observed at least since 1950 and has not been observed 
again.16 The levels for 1981 (99.0) and 1982 (99.6) have been the second and third lowest, 
respectively, for the past four decades. Costa Rica experienced, therefore, an unusually wide 
swing in its international terms of trade. As a consequence, the 1976-1980 boom may have 
loomed larger, by being sandwiched between two major negative shocks.17 
As a result of the terms-of-trade shock, over this five-year period (1976-1980), a unit 
of Costa Rican exports commanded 1.24 times as much purchasing power, compared to a 
counterfactual situation with constant barter terms of trade. The accompanying increase in 
real incomes augmented domestic demand, particularly government activity, and increased 
both the country's creditworthiness in international capital markets and trade with the also 
15 Moreover, to the extent to which the coffee boom increased Costa Rica's credit-
worthiness, it most likely increased the volume of foreign lending to the country. 
16 Actually, the values observed in 1953-58 were by far the highest for the 1920-1990 
period. Between 1920 and 1990, only two times (1954 and 1956) were the terms of 
trade higher than in 1977. See Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Political Economy of 
Central America Since 1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 334. 
17 In this sense, the Costa Rican coffee boom differed from a typical commodity 
boom were peaks are sandwiched by shallow troughs (C. L Gilbert, "Efficient 
Market Commodity Price Dynamics," Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 
Country Policy Department Working Paper 1985:4). 
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booming Central American Common Market partners, important coffee growers as well, 
leading to additional indirect consequences from the boom. 
Export values grew at an average annual rate of 15.2 percent between 1975 and 1980, 
as a result, not only of the rapid price increases, but also of a sustained growth in the 
exportable quantum (4.9 percent per year), as shown in Table 7. As a consequence, 
earnings from exports generated major real income increases for Costa Ricans and brought 
about a period of unusual prosperity.18 
Table 7 
Costa Rica: Index of the Value, Volume, and Price of Exports. 
1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Export value index 100 120 168 175 189 203 204 
rate of change 12 20 40 4 8 7 0 
Export volume index 100 106 116 130 134 127 140 
rate of change -1 6 9 12 3 -5 9 
Export price index 100 113 144 135 141 159 146 
rate of change 14 13 27 -6 4 13 -8 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986. 
Counterfactual total exports were estimated, in order to measure the amount of the 
windfall generated by the terms-of-trade shock, given the following assumptions: 
(a) the counterfactual volume of exports would have been the same as the actual 
quantum observed, and 
(b) the whole of the terms-of-trade changes with respect to their 1975 level repre-
sented a windfall. 
18 Total non-coffee export values, including sales to the CACM, grew rapidly as well, 
at an average annual rate of 13.7 percent for 1976-80. 
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These assumptions somewhat bias the estimation of the windfall, since the observed export 
volumes included boom-induced supply responses, as well as exogenous changes in the 
international markets for other exports. The impact of the positive terms-of-trade shock was 
affected, on the other hand, by negative terms-of-trade shocks just before and after the 
period under consideration. The estimation of the windfall represents, therefore, the net 
combined impact of these developments. Coffee and oil dominated the changes, in any 
case. As shown in Table 6, the country's barter terms of trade, excluding coffee and oil, did 
not change much until 1979 and, even then, the changes were minor, compared to those ob-
served in the case of the full terms-of-trade index. The resulting export windfdall is shown 
in Table 8 and in Figure 2. 
Over the five-year period (1976-1980), the total accumulated exports windfall 
amounted to US$ 800 million. The acceleration of import prices towards the end of the 
1970s eroded the real value of this windfall, down to a total accumulated value of US$ 733 
at constant 1975 import prices.19 The windfall represented a large proportion of total 
annual exports (almost one-third in 1977). It also accounted for a large portion of each 
year's GDP (8.3 percent in 1977, at current prices, and 113 percent of GDP at constant 
prices). 
19 If National Income Accounts statistics, rather than Balance of Payments data are 
used, the corresponding figures are US$ 922 million for the windfall at current prices 
and US$ 843 million for the windfall at constant 1975 import prices. The discrepancy 
results from consideration of trade in both goods and services (including tourism) in 
the National Income Accounts statistics, but only trade in goods in the Balance of 
Payments data. The boom was mostly related to trade in goods. If oil is excluded 
from import prices, on the other hand, the corresponding windfall would be US$ 866 
million (nominal) and US$ 734 million (real). 
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Table 8 
Costa Rica: Terms·of-Trade Export Windfall. 1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Exports81 493 593 828 865 934 1,002 1,008 
rate of growthb' 12 20 40 4 8 7 1 
Counterfactual Exports81 493 498 574 680 804 867 1,018 
rate of growthb' 1 15 18 18 8 17 
Windfall81 0 94 254 185 131 135 -10 
Real windfallc' 0 99 254 175 107 98 -7 
Windfall as a 12ro12ortion (%) Qf: 
Coffee boom windfall 0 129 109 89 68 85 
Total exports 0 16 31 21 14 13 
GDP 0 3.9 8.3 5.3 3.2 3.1 
Real windfall/real GDP 0 4.8 11.3 7.3 4.3 3.9 
at Millions of US dollars. 
bt Percentages. 
ct Windfall in millions of US dollars, deflated by the Costa Rican import price index 
(1975:100). 
During 1976 and 1977, the total exports windfall was larger than the coffee windfall, 
while the opposite was true for the rest of the period. In effect, while coffee prices re-
mained comparatively high through 1980, the barter terms of trade deteriorated towards the 
end of the decade. As a result, the accumulated windfall from total exports was 7.2 percent 
less than the accumulated windfall from coffee exports. Because it better captures the 
nature of the overall prosperity, the analysis of this paper will correspond to the terms-of-
trade shock rather than to the coffee boom proper.20 
2° For simplicity, the term coffee boom will be used to describe the whole set of events 
of the period. 
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2.3 Nature of the Shock 
The event under analysis was a positive terms-of-trade shock, that lasted for five 
years (1976-1980}, associated mostly but not entirely with coffee prices. It resulted in a non-
uniform annual windfall, which sharply increased in 1977, and declined in magnitude after-
wards (See Figure 2}. Given new negative shocks, other influences had become more 
important than coffee by 1980. In particular, debt service problems and new oil price 
increases dominated the macroeconomic events of the last part of the period. Most agents 
attributed the prosperity to coffee exports, and expectations were governed, particularly in 
the earlier years, by the evolution of the world coffee markets. The second oil shock 
changed this expectations structure, but the consequences were not fully felt until the tum 
of the decade. 
Because it followed a severe negative shock (the first oil crisis and low coffee prices 
in 1975}, part of the improvement was perceived as merely a return to a trend, as reflected 
by Costa Rica's very satisfactory output and export growth experience through the early 
1970s. In this sense, the improvement was expected to be permanent. Increased access to 
international capital markets and a growing foreign debt further contributed to the percep-
tion that the boom was not as temporary as it really turned out to be. Indeed, when 
eventually the export windfall sharply declined, towards the end of the decade, real expendi-
tures were sustained, fmanced with increasing debt flows, and this dulled pictures of an 
ending prosperity. Moreover, the change of administration in May, 1978 influenced the 
public sector's behavior with a boom bias. The incumbent (President Oduber) wanted to 
sustain a boom atmosphere, in order to promote the reelection of the ruling party, while the 
23 
victorious adversary (President Carazo) felt naively compelled to prove that he could deliver 
as much as the earlier administration had been able to do during the boom. 
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Figure 2 
Costa Rica: Total Exports and Coffee WindfalL 1975-1981 
(Milliom of 1975 US$) 
Legend 
- Tot3l Exports 
·· ······· Coffee Exports 
· .. 
o~-r----.-----.----.----.-----.---~-
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Source: Tables 4 and 8. 
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To the extent to which the 1975 coffee prices were viewed as exceptionally low and 
were expected to rise, expectations were inclusive.21 Nobody had predicted, however, the 
actual large magnitude of the price increase and, to this extent, expectations were mostly 
exclusive. The largest price increases observed in the previous two decades (28 percent in 
1970 and 43 percent in 1974) were small compared to the boom jumps. The day before the 
frost in Brazil, Costa Rican newspapers had reported that, during the earlier year, coffee 
consumption in the United States had declined 6 percent, while the world's coffee supply 
was expected to increase 35 percent.22 Costa Rican coffee growers were mostly concerned, 
in view of these trends, with the negotiation of a new international agreement to restrict 
world supply. 
Once the impact of the frost became known, increased earnings were expected at 
least for the following two years, after which a price-induced supply response was expected 
to lower prices again.23 By August, the Costa Rican Coffee Institute was announcing a 
price of US$ 100 for the 1975-76 crop, while private producers expected as much as US$ 
150.24 The Minister of Agriculture emphasized that the price increases were entirely 
21 Expectations are inclusive when the shock is consistent with previous expectations 
about permanent income; they are exclusive if the shock was not expected. This may 
or may not lead to a revision of expectations. See Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, 
Op.cit. 
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La Nadon, June 18, 1975. 
The San Jose News, August 8, 1975. 
Excelsior, August 5, 1975 and The San Jose News, August 8, 1975. It was re-
cognized that "Costa Rica will not be able to benefit as much from the new 
prices as it would like, since production has been off in recent years due to 
dropping prices." 
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temporary, in justifying his opposition to tax increases.25 At the National Coffee Congress 
of February, 1976 little attention was devoted to the consequences of the frost in Brazil. 
Coffee growers merely requested that, in view of the high prices, the authorities promoted 
coffee production with technical assistance and credit, so that the country could acquire an 
entitlement to a larger quota under a new international agreement. The National Coffee 
Congress of 1977 explicitly recognized that the boom was temporary and emphasized the 
need for a new international agreement to face the consequences of increasing world 
supply.26 
In summary, to the extent to which expectations were inclusive, they needed not to 
be revised. In addition, because the coffee shock was clearly perceived as exceptional and 
temporary, expectations were not revised either, except to the extent to which these events 
confirmed with a positive actual outcome, earlier held optimistic but still probabilistic 
expectations of income growth, and to the extent to which growth was expected to accelerate 
on the basis of boom investment. 
Using a 10 percent discount rate, the present value of the 1976-1980 windfall was 
estimated to be CR$ 5,827 million (at current import prices) and CR$ 5,334 million (at 
constant 1975 import prices). Under this assumption, the present value of the real windfall 
was equivalent to 31.7 percent of the 1975 real GDP. Fully invested, at an annual rate of 
return of 10 percent, the windfall would have resulted in an annual increase of permanent 
income of CR$ 533 million at constant prices. This was equivalent, in turn, to 3.2 percent 
25 Hernan Garron, in La Nadon, August 6, 1975. 
26 Congreso Nacional Cafetalero, February, 1976 and February, 1977. 
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of the 1975 GDP.27 Such increases i:Q. permanent income would have required that the 
whole windfall be profitably invested. To the extent to which this was not the case (i.e., the 
windfall was consumed or it was poorly invested), the impact on permanent incomes would 
have been smaller than estimated here. It is mostly from this portion of the increased real 
incomes that consumption would have come from in the case of a shock perceived as 
temporary. Thus, a temporary boom should have resulted mostly in an increase in savings 
and investment. Actual consumption and savings responses would thus reveal perceptions 
about the boom as well as the constraints faced by economic agents. 
This temporary nature of the coffee boom contrasted with the implications of the 
earlier oil shock, which was perceived by many as having resulted in a permanent change 
in relative prices and in a reduction of permanent incomes in the oil-importing countries. 
Although Costa Rica attempted to smooth the negative impact on aggregate expenditures 
by heavily borrowing abroad, the reduction in consumption that took place at that time 
meant that the consumption levels later observed during the coffee boom, despite consider-
able increases over previous years, still represented negative or comparatively small positive 
deviations from the values forecasted from the old (pre-oil shock) steep consumption trend, 
27 If the rates of discount and of return used are both 5 percent, the present value of 
the real windfall would be CR$ 5,770 million (34.3 percent of 1975 GDP) and the 
annual return on investment of the windfall CR$ 289 million (1.7 percent of GDP). 
If the rates of discount and of return used are 15 percent, in tum, the present value 
of the windfall would be CR$ 4,963 million (29.5 percent of GDP) and the return on 
investment CR$ 744 million (4.4 percent of GDP). If a 25 percent discount rate is 
used, instead, the present value of the export windfall would have been CR$ 4,362 
million at constant import prices, equivalent to 25.9 percent of the GDP. If invested 
at this higher rate of return, it would have generated an annual increase of CR$ 
1,091, quivalent to 6.5 percent of the GDP. The exchange rate for 1975 was CR$ 
8.57 per US dollar. 
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particularly in the early years of the boom. These circumstances may result in an under-
estimation of consumption flows out of boom income. At the time of the second oil shock, 
on the other hand, the disturbance was perceived mostly as temporary. 
Table 9 
Costa Rica: Trade with Central America during the Coffee Boom. 
1975-1981 
Exports a/ 
rate of changeb' 
ImportsaJ 
rate of changeb' 
aJ Millions of US dollars. 
bt Percentages. 
1975 
107 
3 
115 
1 
1976 
131 
22 
135 
17 
1977 
174 
33 
168 
24 
1978 
179 
3 
203 
21 
1979 
175 
-2 
212 
4 
1980 
270c/ 
54 
220 
4 
ct The unusually large increase of exports to Nicaragua came at the end of the 
Sandinista war. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Balanza de Pagos, several years. 
1981 
238 
-12 
152 
-31 
The other Central American countries, partners in the Common Market, are major 
coffee exporters and, as such, experienced a coffee boom as well. This, in turn, fueled an 
induced boom in Central American trade, which added to Costa Rica's export growth. 
Exports to Central American countries, measured in US dollars, grew at an annual average 
rate of 20.3 percent over those five years, as shown in Table 9. Imports from Central 
America grew rapidly, as well, and Costa Rica had a negative trade balance with the rest 
of the Common Market, except in 1977 and 1980. 
Similarly, rapid economic growth during the coffee boom increased Costa Rica's 
creditworthiness in international capital markets, which were already too willing to lend to 
the country's public sector. The outstanding balance of the country's external debt had in-
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creased from US$ 157 million at the end of 1969 to US$ 520 million at the end of 1975, at 
an annual average rate of 22 percent. This balance further increased during the boom per-
iod, at an annual rate of 34 percent, to reach US$ 2,254 million by 1980, as shown in Table 
10. During the same period, the private external debt doubled and reached US$ 1,042 
thnillion. Over the boom period (1976-80) net resource transfers to country amounted 
to US$963, more than the exports windfall. Most of this (89 percent) was a transfer to the 
public sector. 
Table 10 
Costa Rica: Foreign Debt during the Boom. 1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Public Secto~ 520 643 852 1,115 1,492 2,254 2,655 
rate of growth 28 24 34 33 31 51 18 
Private Secto~ n.a. 523 770 638 758 1,043 956 
rate of growth n.a. n.a. 2 22 19 35 -8 
Total Debt81 n.a. 1,166. 2,262 1,490 1,873 3,297 3,611 
Net Resource Transfersb' n.a. 124 247 183 229 180 96 
Net Resource Transfer to n.a. 91 129 145 292 197 158 
Public Sectorb' 
Real Net Resource n.a. 160 186 210 203 130 65 
Transfersc' 
81 Outstanding balances in millions of US dollars. 
bt Measured in US dollars as the difference between new loans and the flow of 
amortization and interest payments on the debt. 
ctln US dollars deflated by the Costa Rican import price index (1975:100). 
Source: Ricardo Quesada, "Deuda Externa de Costa Rica," Banco Central de Costa 
Rica, 1986. 
While it is to be expected that a positive trade shock with unrevised expectations 
(coffee boom) would mostly increase domestic savings, this massive debt shock would be 
expected to reduce domestic savings, particularly given the high degree of substitution 
29 
between foreign and domestic savings that had characterized the country's history.28 This 
presents a major difficulty in this paper for the interpretation of the consequences of the 
coffee boom on savings and investment flows. 
III. Aggre.:ate Macroeconomic Impacts 
The 1976-1980 terms-of-trade shock and the domestic policy responses to the shock 
dominated Costa Rica's macroeconomic history during the second-half of the decade and 
substantially modified the initial conditions for the evolution of the economy during the 
1980s. After the shock, the Costa Rican economy would never be the same. In an attempt 
to isolate the consequences of this temporary trade shock, a set of counterfactual values for 
the main macroeconomic magnitudes is constructed here and, in turn, contrasted to their 
actual behavior.Z9 The deviations are then attributed to the boom. 
The construction of counterfactuals always presents a major challenge. In the present 
case, the multiplicity of exogenous influences and the complexity of their interactions makes 
it very difficult, both to design a reasonable counterfactual, and to attribute the observed 
deviations to a single influence, such as the coffee boom. For these reasons, the differences 
between actual and counterfactual magnitudes reported here must be interpreted as the 
28 See Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Costa Rica: Macroeconomic Policies, Crises, and Long-
Term Growth," ru. and Luis R. Caceres, "Ahorro, Inversi6n, Deuda Externa y 
Catastrofe," El Trimestre Econ6mico, Vol. LII, July-September, 1985. 
29 For convenience, the deviations of observed macroeconomic magnitudes from their 
counterfactual values are referred to as windfalls. Clearly, these differences do not 
represent a true windfall in all cases, but they are associated with or result from the 
windfall income generated by the boom. 
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outcome of the combined influences of the period.30 Moreover, the magnitude of some 
of these deviations turned out to be extremely sensitive to the assumptions about key 
behavioral parameters in the counstruction of the counterfactuals. As a result, the estimated 
amount of the windfalls is only indicative of their relative importance, but does not repre-
sent the actual magnitude of the impacts.31 
Additional complications in the construction of counterfactuals resulted from the fact 
that the base year (1975) was not typical; i.e., the 1975 values were not close to their long-
term trends. Rather than represent steady-state conditions, the 1975 magnitudes reflected 
a process of adjustment to another major temporary trade distrubance (the first oil shock), 
that was still in progress at the onset of the coffee boom. Key parameters were mostly 
selected on the basis of their trend, rather than 1975 values, in order to correct for this. 
Further difficulties reflected the absence of entirely consistent data sets, the well-known 
complications associated with the construction of index numbers with a distant base year 
(1966, for most Costa Rican macroeconomic series), when economic structures have 
drastically changed in the meantime, as well as the choice of an appropriate numeraire for 
the comparisons across windfall levels for different variables.32 
30 The shortcomings of the partial equilibrium approach adopted are highlighted by the 
multiplicity of events and the complexity of the relationships involved. For these 
reasons, a computable general equilibrium model would have been preferable, but 
was not feasible at this time, and would still not be free from heroic simplifications. 
31 When appropriate, alternative estimates are reported, in order to indicate a credible 
range for these values. 
32 To deal with this issue, two alternative numeraires were used in the computations: 
units of imports at constant 1975 prices or units of GDP at constant 1975 prices. 
Although the absolute amounts estimated differ in each case, relative magnitudes and 
directions of change are the same. 
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Table 11 
Costa Rica: Increase in Real Income as a Consequence of the Export Boom, 1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Gross Domestic Product at 16,805 17,733 19,312 20,522 21,536 21,698 
Rate of Growth 2.1 5.5 8.9 6.3 4.9 0.8 
Balance Qf Paym~nts Basis: 
Export Windfall I bt 0 852 2,177 1,482 921 839 
Real Income I ct 16,805 18,585 21,489 22,004 22,457 22,537 
Rate of Growth 2.1 10.6 15.6 2.4 2.1 0.4 
Export Windfall II dl 0 695 1,598 1,067 697 677 
Real Income II dl 16,805 18,428 20,910 21,589 22,223 22,375 
Rate of Growth 2.1 9.7 13.5 3.2 2.9 0.7 
National Income Accounts Basis: 
Export Windfall IIIet 0 745 1,665 1,154 766 774 
Real Income me' 16,805 18,478 20,977 21,676 22,302 22,472 
Rate of Growth 2.1 10.0 13.5 3.3 2.9 0.8 
Export Windfall as a 
Proportion (%) of: 
Real Income I ct 0 4.6 10.1 6.7 4.1 3.7 
Real Income II dl 0 3.8 7.6 4.9 3.1 3.0 
Real Income IIIe' 0 4.0 7.9 5.3 3.4 3.4 
al In millions of colones at constant 1975 GDP prices. 
b/ In millions of colones at constant 1975 import (foreign) prices and constant ex-
c/ 
dl 
el 
change rates. Values in US dollars (Balance of Payments Accounts) from Table 
8 converted to colones and deflated by the import price and exchange rate index-
es. 
In millions of constant 1975 colones, with windfall valued at constant domestic 
import prices. 
Windfall measured in millions of colones at constant 1975 GDP prices. Values 
in US dollars converted to colones and divided by the GDP deflator. 
In millions of constant 1975 colones. Export values from National Income Ac-
counts in GDP prices of 1975. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, Estadisticas 1950-1985, 1986 and Table 8. 
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3.1 Windfall Income 
Real income was higher during the 1976-1980 period than otherwise, as a conse-
quence of the terms-of-trade shock, which increased the economy's purchasing power well 
beyond normal levels. Following Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, real income during the 
period was estimated as the sum of Gross Domestic Product, at constant 1975 prices, plus 
the export windfall, as already computed in Table 8, which augmented income in a manner 
similar to the discovery of new resources.33 
During most of the boom period, the real rate of growth of the GDP was exceptional-
ly high, as shown in Table 11. Actually, the rate for 1977 (8.9 percent) was the highest 
observed since 1965 (9.8 percent), and has not been replicated ever since. Clearly, this 
acceleration of output growth was in part associated both with the recovery from the first 
oil shock and with the coffee boom, and would not have been as pronounced in the absence 
of this external shock, which stimulated domestic demand and trade within the CACM and 
which most likely accelerated, rather than slowed down, the rate of foreign borrowing. 
It was not possible to measure the extent to which this output expansion was directly 
due to the coffee boom. It is important to recognize, however, that this acceleration of 
output growth, whether induced by this boom or not, added to the rapid increase of real 
income during the period and in part explained the observed macroeconomic behavior. The 
paper adopts, nevertheless, the conservative assumption of not attributing this output growth 
33 Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, op. cit., p. 146. 
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to the boom (except for a minor portion of it34) and, to this extent, this exercise underesti-
mates the amount of windfall income associated with the coffee boom.35 
Moreover, real income grew, in addition to this rapid output expansion, as a conse-
quence of the export windfall. The resulting increase was extraordinary. During the five-
year period, real income was at least 6 percent higher than otherwise, although the expan-
sion was not uniform over time. Real income grew at a rate of over 10 percent in 1976 and 
of about 15 percent in 1977.36 This rate of growth declined afterwards, as a reflection of 
the reduction of the export windfall, but real income remained about 4 percent higher than 
otherwise during the last three years of the period. 
Counterfactual real income would be, on the other hand, equal to counterfactual 
GDP in the absence of the export windfall. The difficult question is to know how much 
GDP would have been had the trade shock not taken place. Following Bevan, Collier, and 
Gunning, counterfactual income can be estimated as the actual GDP minus the return on 
the additional investment induced by the boom. Windfall real income is thus the sum of 
34 The return on windfall investment was computed as windfall GDP, as shown in Table 
12. 
35 To the extent to which most other windfalls are computed by postulating fixed 
proportions with respect to counterfactual GDP, this procedure underestimates those 
deviations, as well. 
36 Table 11 contains three estimates of real income. The first two are based on 
Balance of Payments statistics, as in Table 8. One of them adds to real GDP, the 
export windfall, measured in constant import prices, as in Bevan et al. The other one 
adds, instead, the export windfall measured in constant GDP prices, in order to use 
a common numeraire. The third estimate is based on the National Income Accounts 
and measures the export windfall in constant GDP prices. The results from all 
simulations follow an identical pattern, with real income rates of growth well above 
those for the GDP in 1976 and 1977, and below afterwards. 
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windfall exports plus the addition to GDP that can be attributed to the returns from the 
extra investment out of earlier windfall income, comparatively a very small amount, as 
shown in Table 12.37 
The accumulated windfall income (extra exports plus extra GDP) was substantial, 
amounting to 6,630 million colones, when the export windfall is measured in units of imports 
at constant 1975 prices (Version I), and to 5,331 million colones, when the export windfall 
is measured in units of GDP at constant 1975 prices. This is equivalent to one-third of the 
1975 GDP. Windfall real income was particularly substantial in 1977, when it represented 
between 8 and 10 percent of total real income, depending on the assumptions. 
As reported, the procedure adopted in this paper, following Bevan et al., generated 
a very small GDP windfall, as compared to the deviations from the GDP trend observed 
during the period. An alternative counterfactual might have been constructed, by extrapolat-
ing past GDP growth. 
37 When 25 percent was used, the accumulated GDP windfall was 925 million, com-
pared to 359 million constant colones of 1975 that results from a 10 percent rate of 
return. Even with a 25 percent return, windfall GDP turns out to be very small. 
This contrasts with the observed acceleration of output growth. 
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Table 12 
Costa Rica: Windfall Real Income, Windfall GDP, and Windfall Fixed Investment, 
1975-1980 
1975 1976 1sn 1978 1979 1980 
A Observed: 
Real Income I"' 16,805 18,585 21,489 22,004 22,457 22,537 
Propensity to lnvesf" 22.0 23.4 22.4 23.0 26.2 23.9 
Fixed investment"' 3,695 4,356 4,806 5.066 5,8n 5,386 
Rate of growth n.a. 17.9 10.3 5.4 16.0 -8.4 
Counterfactual: 
Real Income 1111 16,805 17,733 19,287 20,463 21,444 21,515 
Fixed investment"' 3,695 4,105 4,456 4,737 4,964 4,980 
Rate of growth n.a. 11.1 8.6 6.3 4.8 0.3 
Windfalls: 
Real income I 0 852 2,202 1,541 1,013 1,022 
Fixed investment 0 251 341 329 913 406 
GOP" 0 0 25 59 92 183 
B. Observed: 
Real income lllg/ 16,805 18,478 20,9n 21,676 22,302 22,472 
Fixed investment"' 3,695 4,331 4,692 4,991 5,836 5,370 
Rate of growth n.a. 17.2 8.3 6.4 16.9 -8.0 
Counterfactual: 
Real income Ill"' 16,805 17,733 19,289 20,4n 21,488 21,587 
Fixed investment•' 3,695 4,105 4,465 4,740 4,974 4,997 
Rate of growth n.a. 11.1 8.3 6.2 4.9 0.4 
Windfalls: 
Real Income II 0 745 1,688 1,199 814 885 
Fixed investment 0 226 226 251 862 373 
GOP11 0 0 23 45 48 111 
o/ Millions of constant 1975 colones, computed with the export windfall in constant import prices, from Table 11 (Bal-
ance of Payments version). 
b/ Observed ratios of gross fixed capital formation with respect to the GOP, both in current prices. 
c/ In millions of constant 1975 colones, from applying the observed nominal propensities to real income. It is not the 
quantum of investment, since the deflator are import prices rather than capital goods prices. 
dl Observed real income (GOP) minus a 10 percent rate of return on accumulated windfall investment up to the previ-
ous year. 
"' Computed under the assumption of a fixed propensity to 1nvest out of counterfactual income of 23.149 percent. II Return on accumulated windfall Investment In earlier years. 
g/ Millions of constant 1975 colones, computed with the export windfall in units of GOP at 1975 prices, from Table 11 
(National Income Accounts version llij. 
hi Millions of constant 1975 colones, from applying observed nominal propensities to real income, measured In units of 
GOP at 1975 prices. 
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Figure 3 
Costa Rica: Real Rates of Growth of Gross Domestic Product, and Rates of Growth 
of Exports in us Dollars, 1950-1985 
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During most of the the 1950-1980 period, the Costa Rican economy grew at a very 
satisfactory pace, as shown in Figure 3. Exceptionally rapid growth in the early 1950s, 
fueled by traditional exports, was interrupted lade in the decade, as international markets 
became less favorable and coffee prices declined. Growth accelerated again after the 
formation of the Central American Common Market, in the mid-1960s, and was rapid until 
the first oil shock, when it was interrupted again. The coffee boom generated another burst 
of rapid growth, to be followed by a dramatic decline of output in the early 1980s. If the 
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1961-79 period is considered, the rate of real GDP growth was 6.5 percent per year.38 This 
made possible a 3.4 percent annual increase of per capita GDP, despite a high rate of 
population growth. 
The following linear regression was used in order to estimate the real GDP trend, 
for the 1957-1975 period: 
GDP (t) = -294,371 + 150.86 t + 0.829 GDP (t-1) + 0.057 AR(1) 
with adjusted R-Square of 0.996 and Durbin-Watson of 1.96. 
Real GDP for 1974 had been about 110 million colones above its trend value, due 
in part to large coffee exports and in spite of the oil shock, while 1975 real GDP had been 
well below (about 415 million colones less) the forecasted trend. At the end of the boom 
and with the fiscal and foreign debt crisis, on the other hand, observed 1981 real GDP was 
again well below the trend (about 750 million colones). The coffee boom constituted, there-
fore, a period of real GDP values reaching well above the trend, bounded by two years 
when the actual observations were well below the same trend. 
Table 13 
Costa Rica: Gross Domestic Product Windfall and Deviations from Trend, 1976-1980 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed Gross Domestic Produce' 17,733 19,312 20,522 21,536 21,698 
Rate of Growth (%) 5.5 8.9 6.3 4.9 0.8 
Trend Gross Domestic Productb' 17,631 18,848 19,352 20,218 21,087 
Rate of Growth (%) 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.3 
Deviations from Trend 102 823 1,170 1,318 611 
GDP Windfallc' 0 25 59 92 183 
a/ Millions of CR colones at constant 1975 prices. 
b/ From linear regression. 
c/ As computed in Table 12. 
38 The average annual rate of real GDP growth was 7.0 percent for 1963-1974. 
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The deviations of observed GDP from this trend, during the coffee boom period, are 
presented in Table 13, where they are compared to the windfall GDP estimated in Table 
12. The trend rates of growth assumed in Table 13 are below the historical average of the 
GDP rates of change and slowly decline during the period. This recognized the observed 
steady reduction in those rates of growth. The gradual tendency of the rate of growth of 
output to decline through time possibly reflected rapidly diminishing import substitution 
opportunities within the Central American Common Market, itself quite a small market, and 
unfavorable changes in relative factor endowments in Costa Rica, including the exhaustion 
of the agricultural frontier, as well as the impact on factor productivity of the distortions 
introduced by a protectionist strategy of development, the growing institutionalization of 
rent-seeking and other not directly productive uses of resources, and the accompanying 
excessive growth of the public sector.39 The coffee boom merely postponed the process 
of gradual stagnation that would have most likely taken place in its absence. When the 
boom was over, by the turn of the decade, the Costa Rican GDP dropped dramatically, and 
a decade later its real value had yet to reach the earlier trend (even when forecasted at 
these low, declining rates of growth}. 
Clearly, the GDP windfall estimates in Table 12 are much smaller than the observed 
deviations from the trend shown in Table 13. A large portion of these deviations may be 
most likely directly or indirectly related to the boom and may reflect, in addition to the 
returns from windfall investment considered here, the output from increased capacity 
39 For a discussion of these issues, see Victor Hugo Cespedes, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 
and Ronulfo Jimenez, Costa Rica frente a la Crisis. Politicas y Resultados. San 
Jose: Academia de Centroamerica, 1990. 
39 
utilization during the boom as well as other boom-induced impacts. This interpretation is 
plausible, in view of the rapidly expanded output very soon after the onset of the boom. If 
this was the case, the procedure adopted in this paper underestimates windfall GDP and, 
thereby, windfall income as well as the induced windfalls in the disposition of income (con-
sumption and investment). Conservative results are thus reported here. 
3.2 Asset and Liability Chan~es 
Increases in real income are accompanied by changes in asset holdings if any of the 
additional income is saved. When the temporary trade shock is inclusive to existing 
permanent income expectations or, if exclusive, such expectations are not revised, it is 
predicted that most of the windfall income will be saved. Only to the extent that permanent 
income is increased by the shock, will consumption, rather than savings, increase.40 In 
order to estimate propensities to save out of windfall income, counterfactuals to the 
observed asset changes have to be constructed. 
In order to estimate windfall real income, counterfactual and windfall gross fixed 
capital formation were already computed in Table 12. Fixed investment has been the most 
dynamic component of domestic demand in Costa Rica. During the 1966-1979 period, fixed 
investment grew at a real rate of 10.4 percent per year, almost twice as rapidly as private 
consumption. During the crisis of the early 1980s, it was, however, the component of aggre-
gate demand that declined the most. The (real) share of fixed investment in domestic 
40 As claimed, it is initially assumed that in Costa Rica expectations were partly 
inclusive and partly exclusive, but unrevised. 
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absorption augmented, in turn, from 15 percent in the early 1960s, to about 24 percent in 
the late 1970s, and it was particularly high during the coffee boom. As a proportion of the 
GDP, fixed investment increased from 17 percent in the late 1960s, to 21 percent in the 
early 1970s, and it reached a peak of 28 percent in 1979. 
Actual fixed capital formation was estimated by applying the observed propensities 
to invest (in current prices) to the real income series for 1976-1980, as shown in Table 12. 
Counterfactual capital formation was obtained, in turn, by assuming a propensity to invest 
out of counterfactual real income of 23.149 percent for the boom period.41 The difference 
is windfall investment. Two periods of rapid fixed capital formation (investment booms) are 
observed, one in 1976, when fixed capital formation grew almost 18 percent, and another 
one in 1979, when it augmented over 16 percent in real terms. The first boom occured very 
soon after the onset of the coffee shock. The second one was mostly related to accelerating 
borrowing abroad. The investment windfall was particularly large in 1979. Accumulated, 
this windfall amounted to 2,240 million colones at constant import prices (version I) or to 
1,938 million colones at constant GDP prices (version III). This represented 34 or 36 
percent of the real income windfall, respectively. 
An examination of the timing of these windfalls reveals, however, an uneven path, 
as shown in Figure 4. The investment windfall was equivalent to almost 30 percent of the 
income windfall in 1976, but this share dropped to about 15 percent in 1977 and to 20 
percent in 1978. Towards the end of the period, on the other hand, the investment windfall 
41 This is the ratio forecasted for 1975 from the time trend of the real investment to 
GDP ratio. Below, a ratio of 22 percent will be assumed for further computations. 
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was substantial, compared to the income windfall. In effect, in 1979 windfall investment 
might have surpased the income windfall, and in 1980 it was equivalent to two-fifths of 
windfall income and to about three-fifths of windfall exports. 
Figure 4 
Costa Rica: Windfall Real Income and Windfall Investment, 1975-1980 
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While these sharp fluctuations in the marginal propensity to invest out of windfall 
income may be, in part, related to adjustments in the timing of fixed capital formation to 
changes in relative prices and other macroeconomic circumstances, the large propensities 
observed towards the end of the period indicate that investment was being induced by (and 
financed from) something else, in addition to the windfall income from the coffee boom. 
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Indeed, such a surge of investment was most likely associated with the explosive expansion 
of the country's foreign borrowing towards the end of the decade. 
The parallel implications of the external debt boom make it very difficult to evaluate 
the consequences of the coffee boom. First, it becomes very difficult to construct a counter-
factual for the country's liabilities abroad. What would have been the evolution of Costa 
Rica's foreign borrowing in the absence of the terms-of-trade shock? On the one hand, the 
international environment of the second-half of the 1970s was such that a mere extrapola-
tion of Costa Rica's external borrowing before 1975 would not be appropriate. It is evident 
that this borrowing would have accelerated even in the absence of the coffee boom (as it 
already had, with the first oil shock). On the other hand, the terms-of-trade boom obviously 
increased both the country's creditworthiness with international lenders as well as the 
authorities' willingness to borrow abroad. Particularly towards the end of the period, 
borrowing abroad was the political economy response to the need to finance unsustainable 
expenditures triggered, in tum, by the boom. Thus, in the absence of the boom, foreign 
borrowing would have been less than observed and there was indeed an external debt 
windfall, albeit difficult to isolate from the export boom. 
Second, while the windfall in real income is expected to increase savings and, thereby, 
holdings of foreign assets, exceptional access to foreign savings tends to increase the 
country's liabilities and it may thus reduce savings. Indeed, there is substantial evidence 
indicating a strong substitution effect between foreign and domestic savings in Costa Rica. 
The final outcome was the net effect of these two contradictory influences. Increased 
savings are expected from the boom, but if the foreign borrowing effect was too strong, the 
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propensity to save out of windfall income may have just been reflected as less dissaving (less 
debt) than otherwise. It is almost impossible to separate these two effects. 
Table 14 
Costa Rica: Windfall Foreign Assets and Windfall Total Savings, 1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed: 
Real Income ma1 16,805 18,478 20,977 21,676 22,302 22,472 
Propensity to borrow abroadb' 8.5 6.0 5.5 7.9 10.3 10.3 
Current Accountc' 1,427 1,109 1,~47 1,702 2,290 2,324 
Counterfactual: 
Real Income lliaJ 16,805 17,733 19,289 20,477 21,488 21,587 
Current Accountdl 1,427 1,507 1,640 1,741 1,826 1,835 
Windfalls: 
Foreign Assetset 0 399 492 40 -464 -489 
Fixed InvestmentaJ 0 226 226 251 862 373 
Total Savingsr' 0 625 718 2991 398 -116 
Propensity to Saveg' 83.9 42.5 24.3 48.9 -13.1 
a/ 
b/ 
c/ 
dl 
el 
f/ 
g/ 
From National Income Accounts, in million colones at constant 1975 GDP 
prices (Table 12). 
Observed ratios of the current account with respect to the GDP, in current 
prices. 
In million colones, at constant 1975 GDP prices, from applying observed pro-
pensities to real income. 
Computed under the assumption of a fixed propensity to borrow abroad of 
8.5 percent of GDP. 
Accumulation of foreign assets as a result of a current account surplus (or 
less deficit than expected). A negative sign indicates accumulation of liabili-
ties. 
Foreign asset accumulation windfall plus gross fixed capital formation wind-
fall. 
Ratio of savings windfall to real income windfall. 
A first approximation to this savings windfall, a combined result of both sets of 
influences, is computed in Table 14 and shown in Figure 5. Total savings are defined as the 
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accumulation of foreign assets and of domestic assets (represented, for the time being, by 
gross fixed capital formation, as estimated in Table 12). In order to construct a counter-
factual of foreign asset accumulation, a fixed ratio of the current account deficit to the GDP, 
of 8.5 percent, was assumed.42 The coffee boom seems to have brought about the windfall 
accumulation of foreign assets (reduced current account deficit) in the early years (1976 and 
1977), but this was followed by windfall borrowing abroad (1979 and 1980), as the terms-of-
trade shock was gradually replaced by the debt shock. Under these assumptions, the net 
result was an addition of 22 million colones, at constant 1975 GDP prices, to the country's 
foreign debt, as shown in Table 14. Given the values chosen for the parameters, on the 
aggregate the two sets of influences on savings abroad more or less cancelled out, but the 
accumulation followed a well-defined pattern over time.43 
Windfall total savings, defined as the addition of the foreign assets and investment 
windfalls, are shown in Table 14, as well. Under present assumptions, only in 1980 was 
there a decline of savings below counterfactual predictions. Over the five-year period, 
accumulated windfall savings amounted to 1,916 colones.44 This represented 36 percent 
42 This is the observed 1975 value of the ratio. The forecast for 1975, on the basis of 
a linear regression trend, was 11.9 percent, a reflection of accelerating foreign 
borrowing during the first oil shock, but not sustainable. The 1974 value (9.7 
percent) was considered to be too high, as well. 
43 For further discussion of this issue, see the next section. In Table 17, the foreign 
assets accumulation windfall is obtained as the difference between the exports and 
the imports windfall. While following the same time pattern, the results from this 
procedure suggest a negative outcome (accumulation of liabilities). Table 18 reports 
results of a relevant sensitivity analysis. 
44 From now on, unless otherwise noted, all figures are in million colones, as constant 
1975 GDP prices. 
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of windfall real income. This average masks large differences in savings rates over time and, 
as discussed below, between the private and the public sectors. 
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Apparently, over four-fifths of windfall income were saved in 1976, but this propensity 
to accumulate assets rapidly declined afterwards, except in 1979, and it became negative in 
1980. If this last year is excluded, the implicit propensity to save out of windfall income 
would be 46 percent. A high fraction of windfall income was saved during the period 
(comparable to 48 percent in Kenya), confirming the hypothesis that the shock was essential-
ly perceived as temporary. The accumulation of assets would have been even higher, 
moreover, in the absence of comparatively favorable terms for borrowing in international 
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financial markets, particularly since a good portion of the extra debt financed public current 
expenditures, rather than investment. 
3.3 Aggregate Supply Windfalls 
In order to further examine the macroeconomic consequences of the coffee boom and 
to further explore its impact on asset accumulation, counterfactuals were constructed and 
windfalls were estimated for all of the components of aggregate supply and demand. The 
observed ratios of each macroeconomic aggregate with respect to the GDP,in current prices, 
were applied to real income estimates obtained as in Table 11, for each year of the peri· 
od.45 The result of these computations were estimates of the observed aggregates, mea-
sured in units of GDP at constant 1975 prices.46 Counterfactuals were then computed for 
each variable, by multiplying counterfactual GDP by the corresponding ratios, assumed 
constant over the whole period. The value of the ratio was based on the historical evolution 
of these magnitudes prior to the shock. Windfalls were finally computed, as the difference 
between the observed and the counterfactual values of each variable. Attempts were made 
to maintain the consistency of the aggregate supply and demand accounts throughout the 
exercise.47 The results obtained showed different degrees of sensitivity to changes in the 
45 These estimates are based on windfall exports computed from the National Income 
Accounts, measured in constant 1975 GDP prices (version III). The ratio of fixed 
investment to the GDP used was 22 percent, rather than the 23.149 percent used in 
Table 12. 
46 This procedure thus obviates, in building the counterfactual, changes in relative 
prices induced by the shock. 
47 Changes in inventories were computed as the residuals in the identity. This variable 
incorporated, therefore, any errors in the procedure. 
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assumed values of the relevant parameters. Credible results are presented first, followed 
by a simple sensitivity analysis. 
During the coffee boom total imports increased more rapidly than any other ma-
croeconomic aggregate. Between 1975 and 1980, on the average imports (measured in US 
dollars) increased 17 percent per year. In contrast, they had increased at an average annual 
rate of7.7 percent between 1956 and 1965 and of 14.6 percent between 1965 and 1975, with 
particularly high rates of growth since 1972. These substantial import flows during the boom 
were the consequence both of the increased purchasing power of Costa Rican exports and 
of accelerated foreign borrowing. This borrowing made it possible for the current account 
deficit of the balance of payments to steadily increase from 8.4 percent of GDP in 1976 to 
the unsustainable 15.3 percent of GDP in 1980. In real terms, the country's trade deficit 
reached 18.9 percent of the GDP in 1977 and remained close to this high level for the 
remainder of the decade. 
An imports counterfactual was built by applying a constant ratio (0.32 percent) to 
counterfactual GDP, as shown in Table 15. Historically, in nominal terms the ratio of 
imports to the GDP had increased steadily over the years, from 26 percent in the late 1950s, 
to 37 percent just before the first oil crisis (1972) and to 48 percent in 1974. The average 
value of this ratio for 1957-1972 had been 30 percent. In real terms, on the other hand, this 
ratio increased from 35 percent in the mid-1960s, to 42 percent in the mid-1970s, when it 
obtained exceptionally high values. The ratio chosen (32 percent) was compatible with a 
sustainable current account balance of 7 to 10 percent of the GDP. Higher ratios would 
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have implied a much greater use of foreign savings, not credible in the absence of the coffee 
boom and of boom-induced increases in borrowing abroad. 
Table 15 
Costa Rica: Imports and Aggregate Supply Windfalls, 1975-1980 
ImportsaJ 
Rate of Growth 
Observed: 
Real Incomeb' 
Propensity to Importc' 
Importsdl 
Counterfactual: 
Real Incomecl 
Importsf' 
Windfalls: 
Imports 
Gross Domestic Productg' 
Aggregate Supply 
As a proportion (%) of 
Windfall Income: 
Import Windfall 
Supply Windfall 
Windfall Imports as a 
proportion of Imports 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
694 
-3.6 
770 
11.0 
1,022 
32.6 
1,166 
14.1 
1,397 
36.7 
1,524 
9.1 
16,805 18,478 20,977 21,676 22,302 22,472 
38.6 34.9 36.3 36.0 37.2 36.8 
6,478 6,451 7,622 7,810 8,295 8,274 
16,805 17,733 19,269 20,434 21,441 21,537 
0 
0 
0 
5,675 6,166 6,539 6,861 6,892 
776 
0 
776 
104 
104 
12.0 
1,456 
42 
1,499 
78 
80 
19.7 
1,271 
88 
1,360 
96 
103 
16.2 
1,434 
95 
1,528 
158 
168 
17.3 
1,382 
161 
1,544 
147 
164 
16.7 
a! Millions of US dollars, in current prices, according to Balance of Payments 
statistics. 
b/ 
c/ 
dl 
e/ 
fl 
g/ 
GDP plus export windfall, in million colones at constant 1975 GDP prices. 
Ratio of imports to the GDP, in current prices. 
From multiplying observed real income by the propensity to import. 
Computed by subtracting the returns from windfall investment from real 
GDP, assuming a rate of return of 10 percent and a ratio of investment to 
the GDP of 22 percent. 
Counterfactual income times 32 percent. 
Returns on accumulated windfall investment. 
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Windfall imports were particularly substantial in 1977, mostly out of windfall export 
revenues, and in 1979, financed with large inflows of foreign savings and by the drawing 
down of the assets (reserves) accumulated earlier. The windfall accounted for no less than 
12 percent and up to one-fifth of the total imports of each year. Over the period, this 
imports windfall amounted to 6,319 million, about 115 percent of windfall real income, as 
shown in Figure 5 and in Table 15.48 This last proportion was even higher towards the 
end of the period, as borrowing abroad accelerated. From this perspective, therefore, the 
coffee boom was gradually transformed, as its size began to decline, into a foreign debt-
induced import boom. Restrictions on the country's access to international capital markets 
curtailed this increments in imports by 1980 and, when this access was eventually lost, the 
ratio of imports to the GDP sharply dropped, to 31 percent in real terms in 1982. 
Windfall aggregate supply, measured as the sum of windfall imports and windfall 
GDP, indicates the increased availability of goods for domestic absorption and for exports, 
as a consequence of the trade shock. The accumulated windfall amounted to 6, 707 million 
for the period, namely 122 percent of the real income windfall. This proportion was much 
higher during the last two years of the period than in its earlier part, as imports were 
increasingly financed with foreign savings. 
48 This windfall is very sensitive to assumptions about the imports to GDP ratio. Its 
accumulated amount would have been 4,311 million for a 34 percent ratio and 8,328 
million for a 30 percent ratio. 
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3.4 Domestic Absorption Windfalls 
This section explores the extent to which windfall real income may have been used 
to expand private and public consumption and investment. During 1966-1979, government 
consumption increased faster than private consumption, and the difference in rates of growth 
increased through time. The (nominal) share of government consumption in the aggregate 
domestic absorption increased from 11 percent in the late 1960s, to 13 percent in the late 
1970s, and to over 15 percent in 1982, at the worst moment of the fiscal crisis. The share 
of private consumption in aggregate domestic absorption steadily declined, on the other 
hand, from 71 percent in 1966 to 66 percent in 1974. It further declined during the coffee 
boom, to 62 percent at the end of the decade. As already indicated, investment grew twice 
as rapidly as private consumption during 1966-1979 and its share became particularly high 
during the boom. The exceptional rates of growth of fixed investment in 1976 and 1977 
were clearly associated with the export windfall and the accompanying savings during the 
early stages of the boom, while the large increase of ftxed capital formation in 1979 was 
related, instead, to the debt boom and to the behavior of the new Carazo administration. 
The rate of growth of government consumption accelerated in 1976 and 1977 as well, fueled 
by the export boom and, again, in 1979, paid for with foreign borrowing. 
Counterfactuals were constructed under the assumption of a ratio of private 
consumption with respect to the GDP of 70 percent, of government consumption to the 
GDP of 16 percent, and of fixed investment to the GDP of 22 percent. 
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Table 16 
Costa Rica: Private Consumption, Government Consumption, and Fixed 
Investment Windfalls, 1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed Ratios with Respect to the 
GDP:a! 
Private Consumption 71.6 66.4 65.2 67.6 66.9 65.6 
Government Consumption 15.2 16.0 16.0 16.8 18.1 18.2 
Total Consumption 86.8 82.3 81.2 84. 85.0 83.8 
Fixed Investment 22.0 23.4 22.4 23.0 26.2 23.9 
Observedbl 
Private Consumption 12,306 12,260 13,680 14,653 14,921 14,730 
Government Consumption 2,558 2,955 3,33 3,639 4,026 4,095 
Total Consumption 14,864 15,215 17,033 18,292 18,947 18,825 
Fixed Investment 3,695 4,331 4,692 4,991 5,836 5,370 
Counterfactual: ci 
Private Consumption 12,306 12,413 13,488 14,304 15,009 15,076 
Government Consumption 2,558 2,837 3,083 3,269 3,431 3,446 
Total Consumption 14,864 15,250 16,571 17,573 18,440 18,522 
Fixed Investment 3,695 3,901 4,239 4,495 4,717 4,738 
Windfalls: 
Private Consumption 0 -154 192 350 -88 -346 
Government Consumption 0 118 269 369 595 649 
Total Consumption 0 -36 461 719 507 303 
Fixed Investment 0 430 452 496 1,119 632 
As a proportion(%) of windfall in-
come: 
Private Consumption -21 10 27 -10 -37 
Government Consumption 16 14 27 65 69 
Total Consumption -5 25 55 56 32 
Fixed Investment 58 24 38 123 67 
Windfall as a proportion(%) of total: 
Private Consumption -1.3 1.4 2.4 -0.6 -2.3 
Government Consumption 4.0 8.0 10.1 14.8 15.8 
Total Consumption -3.8 2.7 3.9 2.7 1.6 
Ftxed Investment 9.9 9.6 9.9 19.2 11.8 
a/ Magnitudes in current prices. Percentages. 
bl From the multiplication of observed real income, as in Table 15, by the observed ratios with 
respect to the current GDP. Million colones at constant 1975 GDP prices. 
cl From the multiplication of counterfactual real income by a constant propensity for private 
consumption of 70 percent, for government consumption of 16 percent, and for ftxed invest-
ment of 22 percent of the GDP. 
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The resulting windfalls are shown in Table 16 and in Figures 4 and 6.49 A compar-
atively large share (57 percent of windfall income) was associated with windfall investment, 
which amounted to 3,128 million for the whole period. The propensity to invest was high 
in 1976 and, particularly, in 1979 and 1980. The share of government consumption (36 
percent of windfall income) was also high and grew rapidly over time. The accumulated 
government consumption windfall amounted to 2,000 million. These estimates imply, on the 
other hand, that there was practically no private consumption windfall. This suggests that 
the private sector perceived the shock as temporary and saved most of its windfall income. 
The negative private consumption windfalls estimated for the last years of the period may 
reflect a crowding out of private consumption by overexpanded government activities 
triggered by the boom, and illustrate the macroeconomic situation at the onset of the crisis. 
The small (even negative) estimated private consumption windfalls are consistent with 
the actually observed reduction of the ratio of private consumption with respect to the GDP, 
well below historical levels, during the boom. This windfall amounted, as most, to 2.4 
percent of total private consumption (1978). The rising importance of the windfall in the 
case of government consumption, on the other hand, reflects the contrasting behavior of 
these two sectors. Towards the end of the period, the windfall was equivalent to over 15 
49 The assumption about private consumption resulted in a negative windfall during 
some years. With a 72 percent ratio, this windfall would have been negative every 
year, an unlikely event. A lower ratio, such as 68 percent, on the other hand, would 
have required an exceptional drawing down of inventories, in order to allow the 
observed levels of consumption, also an unlikely event. These discrepancies highlight 
the shortcomings of not using a computable general equilibrium model. See below 
for a simple sensitivity analysis. Although the magnitudes of the estimated windfalls 
reported here are sensitive to parameter changes, the trends described are replicated 
by simulations under different assumptions. 
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percent of total government consumption, and this was associated with an increase in the 
ratio of these expenditures with respect to the GDP. In the case of fixed investment, in 
turn, the windfall amounted to about one-tenth of total investment every year, except in 
1979, when it was equivalent to almost one-fifth, as shown in Table 16. 
The annual windfalls observed, as well as the total windfalls accumulated over the 
five-year period, are shown in Table 17 for all major macroeconomic magnitudes. Real 
income windfalls were particularly substantial in 1977 and 1978, when the export windfalls 
were especially high. Over the period, the export earnings windfall accounted for 93 percent 
of the real income windfall, with the rest being generated by the GDP windfall. Substantial 
import windfalls, added to these GDP additions, resulted in aggregate supply windfalls above 
real income windfalls every year except in 1977. 
Added, total private and government consumption windfalls were high in 1978 and 
1979, when they accounted for over one-half of the real income windfall. Nevertheless, 
while the private consumption windfall declined, the government consumption windfall 
sharply increased over time. In the end, the accumulated government consumption additions 
accounted for most of the total consumption windfall. 
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Table 17 
Costa Rica: Aggregate Supply and Demand Windfalls and Asset Accumulation 
Windfalls, 1976-1980 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total 
Windfalls:aJ 
Real Income 745 1,708 1,242 961 936 5,491 
Gross Domestic Product 0 43 88 5 161 387 
Imports 776 1,456 1,271 1,434 1,382 6,319 
Aggregate Supply 776 1,499 1,360 1,528 1,544 6,707 
Exports 745 1,665 1,154 766 774 5,104 
Private Consumption -154 192 350 -88 -346 -46 
Government Consumption 118 269 369 595 649 2,000 
Total Consumption -36 461 719 507 303 1,955 
Fixed Investment 430 452 496 1,119 632 3,128 
Foreign Assets -31 209 -117 -668 -608 -1,215 
Total Assets 398 665 378 451 24 1,913 
Total Assets and Inventories 36 -418 -631 -413 -141 -1,567 
As a proportion (%) of the 
Real Income Windfall: 
Real Income 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Gross Domestic Product 0 2 7 10 17 7 
Imports 104 78 96 158 147 115 
Aggregate Supply 104 80 103 168 164 122 
Exports 100 89 88 84 82 93 
Private Consumption -21 10 27 -10 -37 -1 
Government Consumption 16 14 28 65 69 36 
Total Consumption -5 25 55 56 32 36 
Fixed Investment 58 24 38 123 67 57 
Foreign Assets -4 11 -9 -73 -65 -22 
Total Assets 53 35 29 50 3 35 
Total Assets and Inventories 5 -22 -48 -45 -15 -29 
a/ Computed under the assumptions of Tables 14, 15, and 16. 
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Both domestic and foreign assets were accumulated early in the period, leading to 
high savings rates. Additional foreign borrowing later on reduced, however, the savings 
effect of the boom, which became very small by 1980. If estimated windfalls in inventory 
changes are included in the computation of savings rates, these are sharply reduced, as a 
consequence of inventory desaccumulation, except in 1980, when rapid inventory accumula-
tion anticipated the forthcoming major devaluations of 1981.50 
As indicated, the absolute magnitudes of the estimated windfalls are sensitive to 
assumptions about key parameters. One of them is the ratio of imports to the GDP, so far 
asumed to be 32 percent. This assumption implies moderate access to foreign savings, a 
current account deficit of 7 to 10 percent of the GDP, in the counterfactual (no boom) 
situation. If a ratio of 30 percent is assumed instead (column B, Table 18), implying even 
less access to foreign savings for the counterfactual, the resulting imports windfall becomes 
almost 30 percent higher (8,328 million over five years) and the windfall accumulation of 
external debt reaches almost 60 percent of windfall income. Had the country's counter-
factual access to foreign borrowing been low, therefore, the experience of the period would 
have been associated with substantially larger current account deficits and lower propensities 
to save than otherwise. 
50 Results about inventory changes must be interpreted with caution, since they were 
obtained as residuals from the aggregate supply and demand identity. Actually, 
inventories were drawn down in 1975 (after the 1974 devaluation) and in 1979 (when 
Carazo did not devalue in 1978). Substantial accumulations took place in 1977 (in 
anticipation of an expected devaluation) and in 1980. 
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Table 18 
Costa Rica: Sensitivity of Supply and Demand Windfalls, for the Five-year Period 
A B c D E F G 
Windfalls: 
Real Income 5,491 5,331 
Gross Domestic Product 387 227 
Imports 6,319 8,328 4,311 6,268 
Aggregate Supply 6,707 8,715 4,698 6,495 
Exports 5,704 
Private Consumption -46 -2,054 1,962 -158 
Government Consumption 2,000 4,009 1,937 
Total Consumption 1,955 -54 3,962 1,816 
Fixed Investment 3,128 3,063 1,975 
Foreign Assets -1,215 -3,224 793 -1,164 
Total Assets 1,913 -95 3,921 773 
Total Assets and Inventories -1,567 441 -3,575 -3,575 -1,590 
As a Proportion(%) of the Real 
Income Windfall: 
Real Income 100 
Gross Domestic Product 7 4 
Imports 115 152 79 118 
Aggregate Supply 122 159 86 122 
Exports 93 96 
Private Consumption -1 -37 36 -3 
Government Consumption 36 73 37 
Total Consumption 36 -1 72 72 34 
Fixed Investment 57 36 
Foreign Assets -22 -59 14 -22 
Total Assets 35 -2 71 15 
Total Assets and Inventories -29 8 -65 -65 -30 
Only changes with respect to adopted case (Column A) are shown. 
A: Same assumptions as in Table 17, namely propensity to import (32 percent), private consumption 
(70 percent), government consumption (16 percent), and fiXed investment (22 percent). 
B: As in A, except propensity to import at 30 percent. 
C: As in A, except propensity to import at 34 percent. 
D: As in A, except private consumption propensity at 72 percent. 
E: As in A, except private consumption propensity at 68 percent. 
F: As in A, except government consumption propensity at 14 percent. 
G: As in A, except propensity to invest at 23.149 percent. 
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If, on the other hand, it is assumed that in the absence of the boom, access to foreign 
savings would still have been fairly high, a 34 percent ratio of imports to GDP would have 
been possible. 51 In this opposite case, windfall imports would have been less (Column C 
in Table 18), since high imports would have happened anyway, and over the period there 
would have been an accumulation of foreign assets of 14 percent of windfall income, 
suggesting a very high propensity to save. 
In the credible range for the imports to the GDP ratio, therefore, windfall imports 
were somewhere between 80 and 150 percent of the estimated export and real income 
windfalls, thus increasing aggregate supply to a similar extent. At the same time, the boom 
would have led to somewhere between an accumulation of foreign assets of 800 million 
colones (if import windfall lower than export windfall), and the addition of 3,200 million 
colones to the country's external debt. The range of credible foreign asset accumulation 
windfalls would go from 15 percent of windfall income, with high savings rates, to an extra 
debt of 60 percent of windfall income, in the case of liability accumulation. This last 
outcome would increase aggregate supply by 160 percent and domestic demand by 136 
percent of windfall income. For most of the acceptable ranges for the proportions of 
imports, foreign asset accumulation, and total savings, with respect to windfall income, given 
alternative counterfactual imports to the GDP ratios, positive savings are predicted. 
51 This implies a current account deficit of 9 to 12 percent of the GDP. 
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Figure 6 
Costa Rica: Wmdfall Private Consumption. Windfall Govetnrnent Consumption. and 
Windfall Savings, 197S-1980 
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If the conterfactual private consumption to the GDP ratio is set at 72 rather than 70 
percent, one obtains negative windfalls for every year, an unlikely outcome, as shown in 
Column D, Table 18. With a lower counterfactual propensity to consume (68 percent), 
private consumption windfalls are positive every year, amounting to 36 percent of the real 
income windfall over the period. This outcome would have required, however, substantial 
inventory drawdowns, again not a very likely event. This suggests as more likely an interme-
diate situation, with a positive but very small consumption windfall. 
Similarly, decreasing the assumed government consumption to the GDP ratio, from 
16 to 14 percent, doubles the corresponding windfall to over 4,000 million (Column F), but 
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this would also have required substantial inventory reductions. A higher ratio (18 percent), 
on the other hand, results in negative government consumption windfalls during some years, 
which is not credible. Thus, government consumption windfalls appear to have been 
substantial, of the order of one to two-thirds of the income windfall. 
Because of its impact on GDP windfalls, the assumption about the propensity to 
invest had more widespread implications. Under the assumption of a ratio of 23.149 
percent, as in Table 12, (instead of22 percent), GDP windfalls decline slightly, and the fixed 
investment windfall is cut by one-third, to 36 rather than 57 percent of windfall income. 
Again, these simulations suggest that windfall investment was substantial, amounting at least 
to one and most likely to to two-thirds of windfall income. In turn, the corresponding total 
savings windfall would have been, from minimal to over one-third of windfall income, 
depending on the assumptions. 52 
Such an increase in savings was extraordinary, by historical standards. Costa Rica's 
domestic savings effort has not been impressive. Although the reasons for this are not well 
established, there are indications of a strong substitution effect due to ample access to for-
eign savings. There is also evidence of a dampening impact on savings of the expanded 
social security system and of the enlargement of the bureaucratic middle classes. There has 
been, on the other hand, a strong investment in health and education, that is not recognized 
as domestic savings in the National Income accounts. If at least a portion of these expenses 
in human capital formation were added to the savings and investment flows, the resulting 
totals would look high. 
52 These results ignore the evolution of inventories. 
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Net domestic savings declined from about 9 percent of the disposable national 
income, in the 1950s and early 1960s, to about 6 percent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
This ratio increased during the second half of the 1970s, to a peak of 13 percent in 1977, 
at the time of the coffee boom. This reinforces the claim of significant savings windfalls. 
As already discussed, however, most of the increased savings took place early in the period, 
with asset accumulation turning negative towards the end of the decade. 
Moreover, while private consumption hardly increased (and may have been less than 
otherwise), government consumption windfalls were substantial. This suggests a very high 
propensity to save in the case of the private sector, as predicted for transitory income 
increases, and a very high propensity to consume of the public sector, which thus behaved 
as if the increase in real income was permanent. This behavior, explained mostly by 
political economy pressures to be discussed below, led to unsustainable government expendi-
ture levels and to the fiscal crisis of the early 1980s, when windfall income disappeared. 
That is, private agents behaved as expected of rational decisionmak:ers, given the informa-
tion available about the temporary nature of the trade shock, and their behavior not only was 
not destabilizing, but would as well have induced increased economic growth, if savings were 
profitably invested. The government, on the other hand, ignored the temporariness of the 
shock and, in doing so, brought about macroeconomic instability in the early 1980s. The 
large portion of the public sector windfall spent in consumption was not conducive, either, 
to future economic growth. 
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3.5 Investment Windfalls 
In order to obtain observed values for the components of gross fixed capital formation 
(private and public sector investment, tradable and non-tradable capital goods), the observed 
ratios to the GDP, in current prices, were multiplied by annual real income values. 
Counterfactuals were computed by assuming a share of private investment of 68 percent of 
the total, and a share of tradable capital goods of 48 percent. 53 Windfalls are reported in 
Table 19. 
While the propensity to invest was high in 1976, windfall income was modest and, 
thereby, windfall investment amounted only to 430 million colones. By 1979 and 1980, on 
the other hand, high propensities resulted in substantially more investment. Almost 60 
percent of windfall fixed capital formation was undertaken by the public sector, compared 
to a historical share of 25 percent. The public sector investment windfall was larger than 
the private sector windfall in the earlier stages of the boom (1976 and 1977) as well as in 
1980, when the boom was almost over. Most of the private sector windfall investment came, 
on the other hand, in 1978 and 1979, after a two-year lag, while the private sector was 
crowded out in 1980, as the economy's budget constraint became much more binding. 
Again, private agents behaved as expected, postponing investment from one to two years, 
in order to obtain a higher rate of return, while the public sector invested immediately after 
the onset of the boom, using the resulting windfall, and with the proceeds from accelerated 
foreign borrowing, towards the end of the period, as shown in Figure 7. 
53 A higher ratio for private investment would lead to a negative windfall, which is not 
acceptable. 
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Table 19 
Costa Rica: Private and Public Investment Windfalls and Tradable and Non-Tradable 
Capital Windfalls, 1976-1980 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed Shares of 
Investment: aJ 
Private 64.3 63.5 67.7 66.0 61.3 
Public 35.8 36.5 32.3 34.0 38.7 
Tradable 47.3 50.0 52.0 47.8 42.6 
Non-Tradable 52.7 50.0 48.0 52.2 57.4 
Wingfalls; 
Total Investment: bl 430. 452 496 1,119 632 
Privatec' 130 98 321 646 72 
Publicdl 300 354 175 473 560 
Share(%) 69.8 78.3 35.3 42.3 88.6 
Tradables el 177 312 439 523 16 
Non-Tradables tJ 252 140 57 596 616 
Share(%) 58.6 31.0 11.5 53.3 97.5 
Expenditures: 11 
Private -24 290 671 558 -274 
Public 418 623 544 1,068 1,209 
Share(%) 106.1 68.2 44.8 65.7 129.3 
As a Proportion (%) of 
Income Windfall: 
Investment 58 24 38 123 67 
Private 17 5 24 71 8 
Public 40 19 13 52 60 
Tradables 24 17 33 58 2 
Non-Tradables 34 7 4 66 66 
aJ Observed proportions of total investment, in current prices. 
b/ From Table 16. 
el Assuming a counterfactual share of 68 percent. 
dl Assuming a counterfactual share of 32 percent. 
el Assuming a counterfactual share of 48 percent. 
f/ Assuming a counterfactual share of 52 percent. 
gl Adding consumption and investment. 
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The larger share (53 percent) of non-tradable capital (buildings and other construc-
tion) in the investment windfall reflected the predominance of the public sector investment 
windfall. Following closely the time path of the public investment windfall, most of this non-
tradable investment took place towards the end of the period, as shown in Figure 8, and was 
mostly financed with foreign borrowing. Tradable capital formation (machinery and 
equipment) accounted for 47 percent of the investment windfall and was mostly associated 
with private capital formation. The increase in tradable capital formation was reflected in 
an increase in the relative importance of capital goods in total imports, from 26 percent in 
1975 (which followed the low 23 percent share of 1974), to 32 percent in 1979. As a result, 
in real terms the proportion of capital goods imports to the GDP increased from 9 percent 
in 1975 to 15 percent in 1979 (compared to an average of 7.4 percent for 1957-1972). 
H private capital formation is added to private consumption and public capital 
formation to public consumption, the channels for the utilization of windfall income are 
identified. About three-quarters of windfall income were spent by the public sector, both 
in its current and capital accounts. That is, while private sector consumption hardly 
increased, both public consumption and investment attracted the lion's share of the windfall 
income and the utilization of these exceptional resources was the result of mostly bureau-
cratic decisions. The social profitability of the chosen uses of resources appears to have 
been very low and not conducive to stability and growth. 
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3.6 Financial Windfalls 
As a consequence of exchange rate stability and very low rates of domestic inflation, 
as well as of the relatively high rates of income growth, during the 1960s and most of the 
1970s Costa Rica experienced a significant degree of financial deepening. The ratio of the 
money supply in the broad sense of currency, and demand, savings, and time deposits (M2), 
with respect to the GDP, increased from 20 percent in the late 1950s, to 30 percent in the 
mid-1970s. Most of this process reflected the accumulation of non-monetary assets (quasi-
money). 
The increased real incomes of the coffee boom sharply augmented the demand for 
money and other financial assets. The same procedure employed so far was used to 
compute observed and counterfactual monetary balances. To estimate counterfactual money 
holdings, the trends for the ratios of money in a strict sense (M1), quasi-money, and money 
balances in a broad sense (M2), all with respect to the GDP, were estimated by using 
regression analysis, and values for 1975 were forcasted and then held constant during the 
boom period. These ratios were 31 percent for total liquidity (M2), 18.6 percent for money 
(M1), and 12.4 percent for quasimoney. Windfall money holdings were then estimated as 
the difference between observed and counterfactual values, as shown in Table 20. 
The accumulation of windfall domestic financial assets during the boom was very 
substantial, as shown in Figure 9. The total liquidity windfall amounted to 11,630 million 
(over two times the export windfall). While there was a stagnant demand for money in the 
narrow sense (or even a slight decline, particularly towards the end of the period, as 
inflation accelerated), most of this accumulation of financial assets took the form of quasi-
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money, that is, interest-bearing deposits in both domestic and foreign currency. This 
suggests that these money balances were accumulated for store of value rather than for 
transaction purposes and were one mechanism used by the private sector to postpone either 
consumption or investment until a later date. 
Table 20 
Costa Rica: Money, Credit, and Fiscal Windfalls, 1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed ratios with respect to 
the GDP (%):at 
Total Liquidity (M2) 33 36 37 42 44 42 
Money (M1) 17 18 18 19 18 17 
Quasimoney 16 18 19 23 26 25 
Domestic Credit 37 37 36 40 79 51 
Private Sector 30 29 27 29 31 29 
Public Sector 7 7 9 11 18 22 
Central Government 
Tax Revenues 12 12 12 13 12 11 
Expenditures 18 19 18 20 21 22 
Deficit 5 7 5 7 9 11 
Windfalls: 
Total Liquidity (M2) b1 0 1,151 1,798 2,713 3,113 2,855 
Money (M1) c/ 0 -2 130 264 3 -150 
Quasimoneydf 0 1,153 1,669 2,449 3,110 3,004 
Domestic Creditc' 0 699 1,017 1,778 3,565 3,974 
Private Sectorfl 0 465 340 665 872 510 
Public Sector" 0 235 677 1,113 2,693 3,464 
Central Government 
Tax Revenueshl 0 78 24 246 -24 -87 
Expenditures it 0 466 365 688 849 1,133 
Deficit 0 388 81 443 873 1,219 
at Ratios of financial magnitudes (stocks outstanding at the end of the year) with respect to the GDP, 
in current prices. 
hi On the assumption of a counterfactual total liquidity to GDP ratio of 31 percent. 
c/ On the assumption of a counterfactual money to GDP ratio of 18.6 percent. 
dJ On the assumption of a counterfactual quasi-money to GDP ratio of 12.4 percent. 
cl On the assumption of a counterfactual domestic credit to GDP ratio of 34.4 percent. 
fl On the assumption of a counterfactual credit for the private sector to GDP ratio of 28 percent. 
" 
On the assumption of a counterfactual credit for the public sector to GDP ratio of 6.4 percent. 
bl On the assumption of a counterfactual tax revenues to GDP ratio of 12.2 percent. 
it On the assumption of a counterfactual government expenditures to GDP ratio of 17.5 percent. 
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A similar procedure was employed to compute observed values, counterfactuals, and 
windfalls for bank credit aggregates. The trends for the ratios of total domestic credit and 
of credit for the private and the public sectors, all with respect to the GDP, were estimated 
by using regression analysis, and values for 1975 were forcasted and then held constant 
during the boom period. These ratios were 34.4 percent for total domestic credit; 28 
percent for private sector credit, and 6.4 percent for public sector credit. Windfall credit 
was then computed as the difference between observed and counterfactual values, as shown 
in Table 20. 
A domestic bank credit windfall, closely following the money demand windfall, was 
observed, as shown in Figure 10. In 1980, however, although the demand for money 
declined, domestic credit continued to increase, on the basis of foreign savings. For the 
boom period, the estimated domestic credit windfall amounted to 11,035 million (about two 
times the income windfall). While in the past the private sector had received about 85 
percent of total domestic credit, this situation changed entirely with the boom. In effect, the 
private sector received about one-quarter of windfall domestic credit, while the public sector 
enjoyed access to increasing shares of total credit. It was through this privileged access to 
credit that the public sector was able to finance windfall expenditures well above windfall 
tax revenues, as well as a proliferation of state-owned enterprises (CODESA). This abuse 
of the fiscal function of the banking system eventually led to financial repression, to infla-
tion, and to the contraction of the fmancial system in real terms towards the end of the 
decade. The substantial accumulation of windfall money balances by the private sector did 
69 
not result, therefore, in increased credit for this sector, but it rather helped finance the 
expansion of both public sector consumption and investment. 54 
The evolution of the financial system's portfolio during the boom thus corroborates 
the emerging story. In the presence of temporarily increased incomes, private agents saved 
most of the windfall, partly in the form of foreign assets, but mostly as domestic financial 
assets. Eventually, some of these savings were transformed into private investment. A large 
portion was transferred, however, to the public sector, through an increasing share of the 
government in domestic credit balances and, by 1980, through the inflation tax, which 
eroded a substantial portion of the purchasing power accumulated by the private sector in 
the form of financial assets. Potentially postponed private investment thus never material-
ized, as private savings were shifted towards the financing of public sector current and 
capital account expenditures. Both uses generated low social returns in terms of future 
growth opportunities. 
3.7 Fiscal Windfalls 
Information about public sector revenues and expenditures is, unfortunately, not 
available as needed for a reasonable construction of counterfactuals. In order to obtain a 
first approximation to the impact of the coffee boom on the public sector, counterfactuals 
54 In addition, windfall financial deepening also financed, in the early 1980s, massive 
implicit (both credit and foreign exchange) subsidies granted through the Central 
Bank. The resulting losses for the monetary authority became the main source of 
macroeconomic instability. 
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and windfalls were estimated for the Central Government tax revenues and total expendi-
tures, following the same procedure used for other macroeconomic aggregates. 55 
A comparatively small tax revenue windfall resulted from the boom. Over the five-
year period, a tax windfall, that amounted to 497 million, was equivalent to 9 percent of the 
income windfall, compared to a ratio of tax revenues to the GDP of 12 percent observed 
before the boom. The ratio of windfall tax revenues to windfall income actually increased 
from 10.5 percent in 1976 to 16.6 percent in 1977, and 19.8 percent in 1978, but then 
drastically declined. Overall, and every single year, windfall tax revenues were, nevertheless, 
much less than the extraordinary expansion of Central Government expenditures, as shown 
in Figure 11. 
·--·~ 
·••·•·• De&lt 
1976 1m 1971 1979 
55 The Central Government includes the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches. 
It accounted for less than one-half of the public sector budget. 
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Indeed, while the tax revenue windfall was equivalent to 9 percent of the real income 
windfall, the Central Government expenditures windfall amounted to 64 percent of the 
income windfall. This last proportion was comparatively low only in 1977 (21 percent). In 
1976 and 1978 it was over one-half, while in 1979 and 1980 the Government expenditures 
windfall was higher than the real income windfall. Historically, however, Central Govern-
ment expenditures bad been equal to about 17.5 percent of the GDP. 
With windfall expenditures much higher than windfall revenues, the coffee-cum-debt 
boom caused the Central Government to generate an increasing windfall deficit. Over the 
five-year period, this deficit was equivalent to 55 percent of the windfall income. This, in 
contrast with historic pre-boom deficits of less than 3 percent of the GDP, implies an ex-
traordinary expansion of the public sector. Only in 1977 was the windfall deficit similar to 
observed pre-boom ratios of the Central Government deficit to the GDP. Moreover, this 
deficit surpassed the real income windfall in 1979 and 1980. 
The Central Government budget represented, furthermore, less than one-half of the 
total public sector expenditures. The decentralized agencies and government enterprises 
expanded rapidly during this period, as well. The resulting public sector deficit was financed 
with both domestic credit and foreign borrowing. The windfall associated with domestic 
credit for the public sector, equivalent to one-and-a-half times the real income windfall, 
provides an indication of the magnitude of this expansion, that was financed, in addition, by 
accelerating borrowing abroad. 
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IV. Dutch Disease and Construction Booms 
4.1 Changes in the Pattern of Production 
The prosperity of the second-half of the 1970s was interpreted by Costa Ricans in 
part as a temporary shock and, in part, as a permanent improvement of their real incomes. 
Ample access to international financial markets and the expansive behavior of the public 
sector reinforced the latter perception. There was a consensus, however, that in addition 
to any of these permanent effects, the country was also enjoying a substantial temporary 
windfall from the coffee boom. 
Permanent gains in real incomes are expected to increase domestic demand for non-
tradable goods, raising their relative price, since the price of tradables is given under the 
small country assumption. This should induce a shift of resources towards the non-tradable 
production sector. Temporary windfall income, on the other hand, may lead to a rise in the 
demand of non-tradable capital goods, resulting in a construction boom.56 The compara-
tively small increase in private consumption and the high marginal propensities to save out 
of the export windfall observed in Costa Rica suggest that private economic agents perceived 
the boom mostly as a temporary increase in current incomes. The consequences of their 
behavior were compensated, however, by the decisions of the public sector. This section 
explores the changes in the structure of production that took place during the boom, while 
another section examines the evolution of relative prices during the period, in order to 
identify the presence and magnitude of these effects. 
56 See D. L. Bevan, P. Collier, and J. W. Gunning, "Consequences of a Commodity 
Boom in a Controlled Economy: Accumulation and Redistribution in Kenya 1975-83," 
The World Bank Econgmic Review, Vol. 1, No.3, May, 1987, pp. 489-513. 
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The rates of growth of the GDP increased up to 1977, to a peak of 8.9 percent, and 
subsequently declined. Output stagnated in 1980. The average rate of growth for 1975-1980 
was 5.3 percent per year, lower than in earlier periods, despite the boom. The production 
of non-tradables grew more rapidly, at an average rate of 6.1 percent, compared to 4.0 
percent for the production of tradables, as shown in Figure 12.57 If coffee is subtracted 
from the tradables sector, the average rate of growth was 3.9 percent per annum. 
Within the tradables sector, manufacturing was more dynamic than agriculture, as 
shown in Table 21, possibly as a consequence of the Central American trade boom induced 
by high coffee prices everywhere in the Common Market. To some extent, given high 
degrees of protection, these commodities may be treated as partially non-tradables, at the 
regional level. In this sense, their production was expanded at the expense of exports 
beyond the CACM. 
Besides coffee, other traditional agricultural exports (bananas, sugar, and beet) did 
very poorly, suggesting the possibility of a Dutch disease effect, through the overvaluation 
of the domestic currency, which became substantial towards the end of the period. By 1981, 
however, sufficient devaluation may have contributed to the swift recuperation of these 
traditional exports. These traditional exports were influenced, in addition, by exogenous 
shocks of their own. Agriculture for domestic consumption, on the other hand, which in 
several ways is more a non-tradable sector (perishable vegetables and fruits, basic grain 
57 In the absence of data about tradable and non-tradable production, the former has 
been proxied by the value added by agriculture and manufacturing, while the latter 
has been represented by all other components of the GDP. This assumption is 
justified by the high degree of openness of the Costa Rican economy. 
74 
production protected by import quotas) grew briskly, stimulated by the growth of domestic 
demand. All of these production developments would be compatible with Dutch disease 
predictions for a permanent shock. 
Table 21 
Costa Rica: Real Rates of Growth of Value Added in Several 
Productive Sectors. 1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1212 1980 .1281 
Gross Domestic Product 2.1 5.6 8.9 6.2 5.0 0.8 -2.3 
1. Tradeable goodsat 3.1 3.2 7.6 7.5 1.7 0.2 2.0 
1.1 Agriculture 3.0 0.5 2.2 6.6 0.5 -0.5 5.1 
1.2 Coffee -8.2 -4.0 6.6 13.0 0.1 7.9 6.3 
1.3 Agriculture without coffee 6.4 1.7 1.1 5.0 0.6 -2.8 4.7 
1.4 Other traditional exportsb' 3.3 -2.9 -0.3 6.1 -3.4 -7.3 8.8 
1.5 Other agriculture 10.8 7.6 2.8 3.6 5.4 2.0 0.7 
1.6 Manufacturing 3.2 5.8 12.7 8.2 2.7 0.8 -0.5 
2. Tradables without coffee 4.6 4.0 7.7 6.9 1.8 -0.6 1.5 
3. Non-tradables 1.4 7.3 9.8 5.4 7.3 1.1 -5.1 
3.1 Construction 5.7 20.8 3.9 5.8 19.3 -1.1 -21.7 
at Tradables are proxied by agriculture and manufacturing. 
bt Bananas, sugar, and beef. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, several publications. 
The construction sector experienced two bursts of extremely rapid growth, in 1976 
and in 1979, indicating the presence of short-lived construction booms, as well. While the 
1976 construction boom can be clearly associated with the coffee boom, the 1979 construe-
tion boom is more closely associated with the debt boom. In both cases (particularly in 
1979), the expansion of construction was mostly associated with public sector investment. 
After 1980, when access to foreign borrowing began to be curtailed, construction activity 
sharply declined. 
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Figure12 
Costa Rica: Real Rates of Growth of Tradable and 
Non-Tradable Production. 1970-1981. (Percentages) 
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As a consequence of these differential rates of growth, the share of tradable produc-
tion in the GDP (in nominal terms) declined from 41 to 36 percent during the period, as 
shown in Table 22. If coffee is excluded, the share of tradables declined from 38 to 32 
percent, a substantial drop over five years, with most of the reduction taking place towards 
the end of the period when, in addition to the boom, ample access to foreign borrowing 
allowed the growing overvaluation of the colon, which would be followed by a massive 
devaluation in 1981. The share of other traditional export crops (bananas, sugar, and beet) 
lost three percentage points, from 10 to 7 percent, as a result of their sluggish expansion. 
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Table 22 
Costa Rica: Shares in Value Added of Several Productive Sectors in Current Prices. 
1975-1981. 
~ 1212 l!m 1218. 127.2 l28.Q 1981 
1. Tradable goodsat 40.7 40.1 40.9 39.1 36.8 36.4 42.0 
1.1 Agriculture 20.3 20.4 21.9 20.4 18.5 17.8 23.0 
1.2 Coffee 2.6 4.7 8.3 6.1 4.5 4.5 5.4 
1.3 Agriculture without coffee 17.7 15.7 13.6 14.3 14.0 13.3 17.6 
1.4 Other traditional exportsb' 9.6 7.8 6.7 7.1 7.1 6.6 10.9 
1.5 Other agriculture 8.1 7.9 7.0 7.2 6.9 6.8 6.7 
1.6 Manufacturing 20.4 19.7 19.0 18.7 18.3 18.6 18.9 
2. Tradables without coffee 38.1 35.4 32.6 33.0 32.3 31.9 36.6 
3. Non-tradables 59.3 59.9 59.7 60.9 63.2 63.6 58.0 
3.1 Construction 5.2 5.8 5.2 5.5 6.4 6.2 5.2 
at Tradables are proxied by agriculture and manufacturing. 
bt Bananas, sugar, and beef. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, several publications. 
Manufacturing lost almost two percentage points of its share in the GDP, not much 
compared to what happened to the share of agriculture without coffee, which lost more than 
four points. The share of non-tradable production increased, on the other hand, from 59 
to 64 percent of the GDP. Given its comparatively small size, despite the enourmous rates 
of growth of 1976 and 1979, the share of construction at most reached 6.4 percent in 1979 
and it gained only one percentage point throughout the period. With the devaluation and 
fiscal crisis of 1981, these shares experienced dramatic reversals. 
In real terms, the share of tradables in the GDP declined from 41 to 38 percent, by 
two-and-a-half rather than five percentage points, as was the case with the nominal share. 
This difference was a reflection of the deterioration of the domestic terms-of-trade of the 
tradable sector. The share of coffee remained fairly constant, while the share of tradables 
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without coffee declined from 38 to 36 percent. The share of agriculture without coffee 
declined from 18 to 15 percent. The share of non-tradable production, on the other hand, 
increased from 59 to 62 percent, reflecting both a resource movement effect as well as an 
improvement in the domestic terms of trade of the non-tradable sectors. 
4.2 Employment and Real Wages 
The expansion of economic activity induced by the coffee boom accelerated the rate 
of growth of employment and rapidly increased real wages. From June, 1975 to June, 1980 
total employment increased at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent. As a result, 43,606 
more persons had been added to an employed labor force of 440,942 by 1980, compared to 
the 397,336 that would have been employed if the number of jobs would have grown at the 
1975 rate of 4.4 percent per year (which was already high by historical standards}. The 
annual rates of growth of employment, shown in Table 23, were particularly high in 1976 
and in 1977, and were below historic averages only in 1980, when the fiscal crisis triggered 
a contraction of new job opportunities. 
On the average, employment increased more rapidly in the non-tradable sectors, at 
a rate of 7.4 percent per year (June to June}, compared to 5.3 percent for employment in 
the tradable sectors. This is consistent with the more rapid expansion of non-tradable 
production. This difference in the growth of employment was particularly noticeable in 
1979, when employment in both construction and services exploded, but hardly grew in 
agriculture. The impact of the coffee boom itself had been reflected in very rapid growth 
of employment in agriculture in late 1976 and early 1977. 
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Table 23 
Costa Rica: Annual Rates of Growth of Employment, by Sector of Activity. June and 
December, 1975-1980. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total Employment 
JuneaJ 4.4 6.2 10.2 6.3 7.0 3.3 
Decembe~ 6.1 8.6 7.7 5.1 8.0 -0.4 
Tradablesb' 
June 3.2 5.4 10.4 5.3 3.7 2.1 
December 2.6 10.5 5.6 3.9 3.6 2.6 
Agriculture 
June 2.5 -1.4 14.4 2.3 1.1 3.4 
December -0.5 11.8 3.3 1.9 1.6 5.4 
Manufacturing 
June 3.8 10.9 7.5 7.5 5.6 1.2 
December 4.9 9.5 7.2 5.3 4.9 0.7 
Non-Tradables 
June 5.2 6.7 10.1 7.1 9.1 4.1 
December 8.4 7.4 9.1 5.8 10.7 -2.0 
Construction 
June -3.1 -3.9 4.1 9.9 14.2 -4.2 
December 0.1 3.8 13.4 2.8 9.5 -11.1 
Other Non-Tradables 
June 6.5 8.2 10.9 6.7 8.5 5.2 
December 9.4 7.8 8.6 6.2 10.9 -1.1 
Private Sector 
June 3.4 3.6 10.6 7.6 4.6 2.3 
December 2.7 6.6 10.3 4.3 4.7 1.4 
Public Sector 
June 6.7 12.0 9.4 3.7 12.0 5.5 
December 13.7 12.5 2.8 6.6 14.6 -3.5 
a/ June to June; December to December. 
b/ Agriculture and Manufacturing. 
Source: Academia de Centroamerica. 
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For the whole period, however, employment in agriculture grew only 3.8 percent per 
year, potentially in reflection of Dutch Disease effects towards the end of the boom period. 
Employment in manufacturing grew at an average rate of 6.5 percent per year (close to the 
aggregate average), reflecting the influence of tariff protection as well as the expansion of 
CACM trade during the boom. This impact was particularly important in 1976. 
On the aggregate, employment in construction grew only 3.7 percent per year. This 
was the result, however, of exceptionally high rates of growth of construction employment 
from 1977 to 1979, preceeded and followed by reductions in the number of jobs. Rather 
than a sustained expansion, employment experienced bursts concentrated around construc-
tion booms. This contrasted with the exceptionally high growth of employment in other non-
tradable sectors (services), at an average rate of 7.9 percent per year. This essentially 
reflected the expansion of the public setor, mostly in the autonomous institutions. While 
private sector employment increased 5.7 percent per year, public sector jobs augmented 8.5 
percent annually. This growth of public sector employment was one of the implicit policies 
to keep unemployment low, particularly in he case of qualified and professional workers, in 
the presence of commercial and factor price policies that reduced incentives to hire in the 
modem private sectors. 
Growing public sector employment reflected, as well, the increasing intervention of 
the state in the economy and the accumulation of entitlements to public services. Boosted 
by the coffee boom, this expansion of the public sector was not sustainable in the long run 
and was at the roots of the fiscal disequilibria of the early 1980s. Moreover, given the 
importance of wages in total public sector expenditures, it became politically difficult to 
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reduce government spending once the boom was over. The concentration of workers in 
large public institutions allowed their unionization. These unions blocked, in turn, any 
attempts at fiscal austerity. 
Table 24 
Costa Rica: Annual Rates of Change of Average Real Wages, by Sector of Activity. 
June and December, 1975-1980. 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Total Employment 
June at 
-2.9 4.1 11.4 8.6 5.6 -2.2 
December at 1.7 11.8 9.8 6.5 3.8 -0.4 
Tradables b/ 
June -6.1 7.5 11.7 8.4 6.1 -2.0 
December -0.3 15.1 6.5 6.3 6.2 3.4 
Agriculture 
June -4.3 6.6 21.8 9.9 10.0 -5.1 
December -1.4 29.2 6.1 7.3 7.5 9.4 
Manufacturing 
June -7.2 5.6 8.2 6.9 3.7 -0.2 
December -0.1 7.2 7.8 5.0 5.0 1.0 
Non-Tradables 
June -1.7 2.4 11.3 8.4 4.8 -2.6 
December 2.2 10.3 11.2 6.4 2.2 -2.1 
Construction 
June -1.8 5.3 11.2 6.4 6.3 1.9 
December 4.9 15.6 22.3 2.9 1.1 -7.3 
Other Non-Tradables 
June -2.2 1.7 11.1 8.7 4.9 -3.3 
December 1.4 9.2 10.2 6.8 2.5 -2.2 
Private Sector 
June -7.1 4.7 10.1 8.5 5.5 -2.7 
December -2.4 11.3 11.9 3.5 5.2 -1.1 
Public Sector 
June 1.3 0.8 13.2 10.0 3.3 -2.8 
December 5.4 9.4 8.0 11.2 0.1 -0.7 
a/ June to June; December to December. 
b/ Agriculture and Manufacturing. 
Source: Academia de Centroamerica. 
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As a result of these differential rates of growth of employment, from 1975 to 1980 
(June to June) the share of jobs in tradables production dropped from 39.9 to 37.6 percent, 
while the share of the non-tradable sectors in total employment increased from 60.1 to 62.4 
percent. In turn, the share of private sector employment dropped from 69.2 to 66.4 percent 
and the share of public sector employment increased from 30.8 to 33.7 percent during the 
same period. The share of private sector workers in the total wage bill diminished from 
52.9 percent in 1975 to 50.2 percent in 1980, despite the more rapid growth of private sector 
wages. 
The boom was accompanied in general by a rapid growth of real wages, at an average 
rate of 7.9 percent per year from December 1975 to December 1979, followed by a slight 
decline in 1980, as inflation accelerated with the fiscal crisis. The increases were exceptional 
in 1976 and 1977 (over 11 percent), as shown in Table 24. The impact of the boom on 
agricultural wages is evident. For 1975-1979 (December to December), real agricultural 
wages grew 12.1 percent per year. The increase was almost 30 percent in 1976 (December 
to December) and 22 percent in 1977 (June to June). As a result, the ratio of agricultural 
wages to the economy's average wage augmented from 53 percent in 1975 to 63 percent in 
1979. Real wages in manufacturing augmented, on the other hand, 6.2 percent per year, still 
a significant increase. The construction boom resulted in a 10.1 percent annual increase in 
real wages in this other sector. These increases were exceptional in 1976 (16 percent) and 
1977 (22 percent). Average wages in the service sector increased 7.1 percent per year, a less 
dramatic but sill substantial increase. In summary, although the coffee windfall was first 
received by a sub-sector of agriculture, its consequences resulted in major real wage 
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increases throughout the economy. The weight of agriculture resulted in real wages 
increasing 8.5 percent per year in tradable activities, compared to 7.4 percent in non-
tradables production. Wages increased more rapidly in the private sector (7.9 percent) than 
in the public sector (7.1 percent), for the same reason. 
4.3 The Domestic Terms of Trade 
Both the growth in domestic demand for non-tradable consumer goods and the con-
struction boom, which increased the demand for domestically-produced capital goods, are 
expected to change relative prices. The evolution of the value added deflators for the 
various productive sector shown in Table 25 indicates an improvement in the relative price 
of non-tradable with respect to tradable goods in general. 
Table 25 
Costa Rica: Value Added Deflators for Several Productive Sectors. 
1975-1981 
1975 1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Gross Domestic Product 100 117 136 147 161 191 269 
1. Tradable goods aJ 100 117 142 145 153 181 282 
1.1 Agriculture 100 123 164 165 170 197 334 
1.2 Coffee 100 229 483 363 307 338 526 
1.3 Agriculture without coffee 100 107 117 134 150 175 306 
1.4 Other traditional exports bl 100 103 112 130 153 182 385 
1.5 Other agriculture 100 111 122 139 145 167 227 
1.6 Manufacturing 100 112 122 128 139 168 238 
2. Tradables without coffee 100 110 120 130 143 170 265 
3. Non-Tradables 100 116 133 176 165 196 260 
3.1 Construction 100 114 125 144 161 190 278 
3.2 Services 100 114 128 148 169 197 254 
3.3 General Government 100 124 150 177 206 240 286 
aJ Tradables are proxied by agriculture and manufacturing. 
bl Bananas, sugar, and beef. 
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While for the five-year period, the GDP deflator increased 91 percent, the prices of 
tradables (including coffee) increased 81 percent and the prices of non-tradables increased 
96 percent. If coffee is excluded from tradables, the prices of these goods increased only 
70 percent. The prices of agricultural goods (excluding coffee) increased 75 percent, while 
the price of manufactured commodities increased only 68 percent, reflecting, in addition to 
the Dutch disease effect, an endogenous trade liberalization effect as a consequence of the 
boom, as shown in Figure 13. The prices of other crops, mostly for domestic consumption, 
increased the least (67 percent). 
Figure 13 
Costa Rica: Implicit Deflators of Value Added. 
by Sector 1975-1980. (1975:100). 
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While the relative price of tradables, excluding coffee, with respect to the GDP 
declined to 89 percent by 1980, the relative price of non-tradables increased to 103, as 
shown in Table 26. As a consequence, the relative price of non-tradables with respect to 
tradables, excluding coffee, increased 14 percent throughout the period, as shown in Figure 
14. 
FtgUte 14 
Costa Rica: Relative Prices of Non-Tradable to Several 
Classes of Tradable Goods. 1976-1980 
(1975:100). 
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The relative price of non-tradables with respect to agricultural goods (excluding 
coffee) increased over 9 percent, while the relative price of non-tradables, with respect to 
manufacturing increased 17 percent. This last effect possibly reflected the endogenous trade 
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liberalization that took place due to the boom. This also implies that the relative price of 
agricultural goods, excluding coffee, with respect to manufactures, improved by 7 percent. 
Table 26 
Costa Rica: Relative Prices of Value Added, for Several Productive Sectors. 
1975-1981 
Relative Price with respect to the 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Gross Domestic Product: 
1. Tradable goodsat 100 101 104 98 96 95 105 
1.1 Agriculture 100 105 120 112 106 103 124 
1.2 Coffee 100 197 354 247 191 177 195 
1.3 Agriculture without coffee 100 92 86 91 93 92 112 
1.4 Other traditional exportsb' 100 88 82 88 95 96 143 
1.5 Other agriculture 100 96 89 94 90 87 84 
1.6 Manufacturing 100 96 90 87 87 88 88 
2. Tradables without coffee 100 94 88 88 89 89 99 
3. Non-tradables 100 99 97 101 103 103 97 
3.1 Construction 100 98 92 98 100 99 103 
3.2 Personal Services 100 100 98 94 100 105 94 
3.3 Government 100 106 110 120 128 126 106 
at Tradables are proxied by agriculture and manufacturing. 
bl Bananas, sugar, and beef. 
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica, several publications. 
The evolution of these domestic terms of trade of several sectors of economic activity 
is reported in Figure 15, where the relative prices of value added by each sector, with res-
pect to the GDP, are represented. The terms of trade of agriculture improved with the cof-
fee shock in 1976 and 1977, to a peak of 120 percent with respect to 1975. Afterwards, 
these terms of trade deteriorated, as the price of coffee began to drop. The relative price 
of non-coffee agriculture deteriorated during the first two years of the period, but then 
slightly improved. This reflected the behavior of the terms of trade of other traditional 
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export crops, which first sharply deteriorated, as a consequence of Dutch disease effects, but 
then experienced a partial recovery. The terms of trade of other crops, including both non-
export agriculture, first declined but then, as increased incomes augmented the demand for 
domestic foodstuffs, slightly improved and finally dropped in 1980, in part as a reflection of 
the fiscal crisis. 
Figure 15 
Costa Rica: Relative Prices of Value Added, 
by Sector, with respect to the GDP 
1976-1980. (1975:100). 
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The terms of trade of manufacturing rapidly and steadily declined, as a consequence 
of induced trade liberalization after the onset of the boom. Import restrictions had been 
imposed in 1974, in response to the first oil shock. These included temporary surcharges 
on imports, selective consumption taxes on typically imported commodities, and restrictions 
on credit terms on the sales of imported durable goods. 58 Beginning in 1976, these tempo-
rary import restrictions were progressively reduced. 
Windfall incomes were then spent on imports of the restricted commodities, par-
ticularly consumer durables. The share of consumer durables in total imports increased 
from 6.7 percent in 1975 to over 10 percent in 1978 and 1979.59 The share of non-durable 
consumer goods increased from 14.1 percent in 1975 to 15.3 percent by 1978 and to 16.1 
percent in 1980. Combined, by the end of the period, the shares of imports of consumer 
goods had gained five percentage points. The resource movement effect was reflected, in 
tum, by declining shares of imports of raw materials for manufacturing and for agriculture. 
Combined, these shares declined from 41.2 percent in 1975 to 34.8 percent in 1979. The 
shares of capital goods for construction and of building materials increased in 1977 and 
1978, while the share of capital goods for manufacturing increased in 1979, in reflection of 
the large investment boom of that year. 
58 Minimum downpayments, minimum interest rates, and maximum terms to maturity 
were decreed for sales of consumer durables, most of which are imported. 
59 To the extent that the accumulation of consumer durables may be interpreted as 
capital accumulation at the household level, a good portion of what has been called 
the private sector consumption windfall actually represented this form of investment. 
This suggests that private agents behaved as expected, with their decisions modified 
by changes in the policy regime. 
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Surprisingly, the relative price of construction with respect to the GDP slightly de-
clined, to 98 percent of its 1975 level, during the first construction boom in 1976. The 
reduction was much greater the following year, when this boom was over. This relative 
price increased back to 100 with the 1979 construction boom. In the non-tradable sector, 
therefore, the improvement in relative prices was due mostly to an increase in the price of 
services. The relative price of personal services with respect to the GDP increased 5 
percent over the period, with most of the gains towards the end of the decade. The most 
outstanding change was, however, the increase in the relative price of government services, 
of 26 percent with respect to the GDP deflator, and of 41 percent with respect to the price 
of tradables excluding coffee. Since the price of government services is essentially a proxy 
for general government wages, this indicates that one of the major beneficiaries of the 
coffee boom and, particularly, of the debt boom were public servants, whose numbers and 
salaries rapidly increased. 
4.4 Construction Booms 
Two construction booms were observed during the period under study. The real rate 
of growth of value added in construction was about 20 percent both in 1976 and in 1979. 
These two periods coincided with substantial estimated fixed investment windfalls, as shown 
in Table 16, mostly of the public sector in 1976, after the onset of the boom, and associated 
with capital formation of both sectors in 1979 due, in part, to the postponement of private 
sector investment and, in part, to the foreign savings financing of public sector investment 
in the early stages of the Carazo administration. It is possible that the construction boom 
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in 1979 might have in part reflected the accumulation of inflation hedges, in anticipation of 
the major fiscal crisis of the early 1980s. 
Construction boom theory predicts that, in these circumstances, a temporary trade 
shock will not only induce a rise in the price of all classes of non-tradable commodities, 
relative to tradables, as a consequence of Dutch disease spending and resource movement 
effects, but also a rise in the relative price of non-tradable capital goods relative to non-
tradable consumer goods, in response to the dynamic investment effect of the temporary 
shock. 60 As already indicated, there is evidence in Costa Rica of increased relative prices 
of non-tradables with respect to tradables.61 Beyond this general result, addition conclu-
sions are more difficult to obtain. 
Table 27 
Costa Rica: Relative Price of Capital Goods 
Relative Price with respect to the 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Gross Domestic Product: 
1. Gross Fixed Capital 100 91 84 85 88 89 
1.1 Private 100 89 83 83 87 87 
1.2 Public 100 94 85 89 90 92 
2. Non-Tradable Capital 100 93 85 88 96 95 
2.1 Private 100 92 84 85 96 96 
2.2 Public 100 93 86 90 96 99 
3. Tradable Capital 100 89 83 84 83 82 
3.1 Private 100 89 83 84 83 82 
3.2 Public 100 89 84 84 73 86 
aJ Tradables are machinery and equipment. 
bt N on-tradables are buildings and other construction. 
60 Bevan et al., Op. cit., p. 102. 
61 Caution should be exercised, since there is no perfect coincidence between tradables 
and non-tradables and the aggregates used to proxy these categories of goods. 
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Despite the substantial increase in investment observed during the boom period, the 
relative price of capital goods (investment deflator) with respect to the GOP actually 
declined, as shown in Table 27. In effect, this relative price dropped to 84 percent in 1977 
and then slowly climbed up to 89 percent by 1980. The reduction took place both with 
respect to tradable capital, for which the index steadily dropped, to 82 percent in 1980, and 
for non-tradable capital, for which the index dropped less, only to 95 percent by 1980.62 
In fact, the relative price of non-tradable capital first declined to 85 percent in 1977 and 
then increased to 96 percent in 1979, at the time of the major investment boom. Thus, the 
relative price of non-tradable with respect to tradable capital increased to 115 percent of 
its 1975 level by 1980, despite the general reduction of the relative price of capital, as shown 
in Figure 16. This reflects both the endogenous trade liberalization, the gradual over-
valuation of the domestic currency, and the impact of the construction booms as predicted. 
Because of the close association between non-tradable capital and public sector 
investment, the relative price of public sector capital formation declined to only 92 percent, 
while the relative price of private sector capital formation declined to 87 percent. Thus, the 
relative price of public capital with respect to private capital increased to 106 percent, as 
shown in Figure 17. 
62 Tradable capital is proxied by machinery and equipment and non-tradable capital by 
buildings and construction of structures. 
91 
Figule 16 
Costa Rica: Relative Prio:e of Tradable and Nm-Tradable 
Capital Gooch. with rcspcct to the ODP. 
197S-19SO. (197S:100). 
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There is no sufficient evidence of an increase in the relative price of non-tradable 
capital with respect to non-tradable consumer goods. The relative price of value added in 
construction, relative to personal services, declined slightly, to 96.1 percent by 1980. Indeed, 
both the prices of services and of construction increased rapidly during the boom. The 
prices of services may, in part, have increased too rapidly as a consequence of the ac-
celeration of government services prices, in reflection of the large government consumption 
windfalls, in very competitive labor markets. Similarly, the relative price of value added in 
construction, relative to commercial activities, declined to 98.9 percent by 1980. Finally, the 
relative price of non-tradable capital goods with respect to services declined to 87.4 percent 
in 1978 and partially recuperated to 91.7 percent by 1980. None of these relative prices 
provides evidence about the expected relative price changes. Capital goods, in general, be-
came cheaper after the boom. Since the price of tradable capital goods declined faster, the 
relative price of non-tradable to tradable capital goods increased, but this pattern was not 
observed with respect to consumption goods. Mter initially declining, the price of capital 
with respect to manufactured goods increased to 101.4 percent in 1979 and 1980. This was 
the only instance of increasing relative capital goods prices. 
V. Distribution of the Coffee Windfall 
The sharp increase in international coffee prices of the second-half of the 1970s 
substantially augmented the incomes of all of the participants in the Costa Rican coffee sec-
tor. This section explores the distribution of the resulting windfall among these participants, 
which include 26 exporting houses, a few domestic toasters (torrefactores) who account for 
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4 percent of the value added in the sector, over 100 beneficios (hullers and processors for 
export), growers, wage laborers, input suppliers, and the public sector. 
There is very little concentration of coffee production in the country. At the time 
of the 1973 Agricultural Census, 32,353 coffee farms had been identified, representing 39 
percent of the total number of farms in the country. They grew coffee in 83,407 hectares 
of land, equivalent to 17 percent of the country's cultivated area. The average size of a 
coffee farm was 2.58 hectares. About three-quarters of the number of farms had less than 
50 hectares. These are small but very valuable family exploitations, frequently located near 
urban centers. At the time of the 1984 Agricultural Census, there were 34,464 coffee farms, 
producing in 97,000 hectares of land.63 
Exporting houses are highly specialized. Ten of the existing 26 have dominated the 
exporting activity. There were 106 beneficios, 29 of which were cooperatives. About one-
half of them both grew and processed coffee, but 87 percent of the crop was purchased from 
individual producers. There is substantial competition among beneficios for the crop of 
independent producers. Labor comes both from the household and from wage earners, 40 
percent of whom are permanent, and the rest hired as pickers during the harvest. About 
170,000 workers participated in producing the crop in the late 1970s; of these, one-quarter 
worked in the plantations, two-thirds worked as pickers, and the rest in the beneficios. They 
represented one-fifth of the Costa Rican labor force, and have enjoyed steadily increasing 
real wages. 
63 The average size of a coffee farm was 2.81 hectares in 1984. 
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There is strong government control of the coffee sector and the relationships among 
these different participants are strictly regulated. Beneficios should sell the coffee of a given 
year (picked from June to April) by September of the following year and turn the corres-
ponding documents to the Coffee Institute (I CAFE), for the estimation of the final price to 
be paid to the growers. Partial payments during the year are not required, but the beneficios 
make advances for competitive reasons. Exporter's costs and regulated profits are deducted 
from actual FOB prices, and adjustments are made for coffee devoted to domestic consump-
tion. The beneficios are allowed deductions of taxes, milling charges (variable but not fixed 
costs), and profits of 9 percent of the total sales revenues. The rest must be paid, by law, 
to producers. The beneficio operates as a trustee and is subject to clear accountability to 
the grower. Despite these government regulations, the system is very competitive at all 
levels.64 
In his analysis of income distribution in the coffee sector, Bornemisza estimated the 
shares of these participants in the total export revenues.65 Given the insignificant value 
added by coffee roasters and export companies, these two groups are not considered for 
these purposes. Table 28 shows the shares of the various groups for the boom period 1975-
1980. 
64 Rigoberto Stewart, "A Study of Costa Rica's Coffee Marketing System," unpublished 
report, 1989. 
65 Paul Bornemisza, Evolucion de la Distribucion del lngreso en el Sistema Cafetero 
Costarricense desde 1974 hasta 1984, San Jose: University of Costa Rica, thesis, 1986. 
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Table 28 
Costa Rica: Distribution of Total Revenues in the Coffee Sector, 1975-
1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Labor 31.7 19.6 31.9 37.7 27.3 15.4 
Coffee Growers 19.7 45.0 25.7 14.7 31.0 36.7 
Input Suppliers 25.8 14.0 23.8 24.8 21.7 18.5 
Public Sector 22.4 16.9 17.0 20.0 16.4 19.8 
Beneficios 0.4 4.5 1.6 2.8 3.6 9.6 
Source: Bornemisza, Paul, Op. Cit. 
The coffee export windfall (computed in Table 4) was assigned to the various 
participants in the sector, under the assumption that the distribution observed in 1975 
represents a reasonable counterfactual. All participants obtained substantial windfall 
incomes from the boom, as shown in Table 29. Among them, laborers and growers obtained 
the largest shares of the windfall. Indeed, the gains that accrued to labor, for US$ 218 
million, represented 25 percent of the five-year windfall. Almost three-quarters of these 
labor windfall was received in 1977 and 1978. Growers, on the other hand, received a wind-
fall of US$ 290 million, or 34 percent of the extra revenue. In the first year of high prices 
(1976) coffee growers were the most favored group, extracting 73 percent of the additional 
revenues. Afterwards, however, the government, via taxes, labor, via wage increases, and 
input suppliers, through a derived demand, augmented their participation in the windfall. 
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Table 29 
Costa Rica: Distribution of the Coffee Export Revenue and of the Coffee Windfall, 
1975-1980 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Observed:., 
Labor 30 30 102 118 86 38 
Coffee growers 19 69 82 46 98 91 
Providers of inputs 25 22 76 78 68 46 
Government 21 26 54 63 52 49 
Beneficios _o __:]_ _s_ __2 _u 24 
95 154 319 314 315 248 
CQunt~rfa~tual:., 
Labor 30 26 27 35 39 29 
Coffee growers 19 16 17 21 24 18 
Providers of inputs 25 21 22 28 32 23 
Government 21 18 19 24 28 20 
Beneficios _Q _Q _o _1 _Q _Q 
95 81 85 109 123 90 
Windfall:., 
Labor 0 4 75 83 47 9 
Coffee growers 0 53 65 25 74 73 
Providers of inputs 0 1 54 50 36 23 
Government 0 8 35 39 24 29 
Beneficios !! ....1 _s_ _..8 _ll ~ 
0 73 234 205 192 158 
a/ Millions of US dollars. 
The share of input suppliers amounted to US$ 164 million (almost one-fifth of the 
windfall}. This represents gross income, however, since their costs are not known. Their 
participation was high in 1977 and 1978, when the high coffee prices induced an increased 
supply of the crop and increased induced demand for inputs. Input prices also augmented. 
The share of the public sector, amounting to US$ 135 million, represented 16 percent of the 
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total windfall, and was therefore comparatively small. This share included, in addition to 
taxes, payments for the use of public utilities and other government services. Beneficios, 
finally, received only 6 percent of the windfall (US$ 55 million), given strict regulations 
about their profit margins. Over the five-year period, on the average, the coffee windfall 
amounted to about US$ 1,300 per worker, US$ 9,000 per grower, and US$ 500,000 per 
beneficio. 66 
VI. Trade Shocks. Policy Responses, and Fiscal Crisis 
Among Latin American countries, Costa Rica has been unique in terms of its polit-
ical stability and the strength of its democratic institutions. Sustained political stability has 
promoted economic growth: it has favored investment, attracted foreign savings, and reduced 
the risks and transactions costs of economic activity, by promoting an institutional infra-
structure that has efficiently defined property rights and facilitated the enforcement of con-
tracts. The absence of an army released resources for education, health, and physical infra-
structure. An emphasis on equity reinforced human capital formation. As a result, for a 
long time Costa Rica enjoyed rapid economic growth, while its major indicators reflected 
a higher quality of life than would be predicted for its per capita income level. Income in-
equality has been moderate and, in reflection of all of this, through the mid-1970s, Costa 
Rica was an example of growth-cum-equity.67 
66 The author is grateful to Juan Munoz for computations of these windfalls. 
67 All of this has been documented by Claudio Gonzalez-Vega and Victor Hugo 
Cespedes, The Political Economy of Growth. Equity. and Poverty Alleviation. Costa 
Rica:1950-1985, monograph prepared for the World Bank Project on The Political 
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Indeed, between 1961 and 1979, an average rate of growth of the GDP of 6.5 percent 
per year allowed a 3.4 percent increase in per capita GDP. These rates of growth molded 
the expectations of Costa Ricans in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, growth took place despite 
the country's vulnerability to external shocks; income instability and growth had been com-
patible. Cautious macroeconomic management had made it possible, on the other hand, to 
successfully isolate the macroeconomy from external fluctuations. From 1950 to just before 
the first oil shock, the country's average rate of inflation had been less than 2 percent per 
year.68 A fixed exchange rate system had been successfully sustained by an independent 
Central Bank and substantial financial deepening had taken place. 
By the mid-1970s, not all trends were positive. Promotion of manufacturing in the 
context of the Central American Common Market had initially accelerated growth, in the 
1960s, as a result of increased regional trade. By the mid-1970s, however, the easy stages 
of import substitution had already been exhausted, new exports had been discouraged, dis-
tortions had slowed down the growth of productivity, and increasingly powerful interest 
groups were devoting scarce resources to directly unproductive activities. Education and 
social mobility had fueled rising expectations and growing demands for public-sector ser-
vices. Combined with a strong concern for equity, these demands had led to the institu-
tionalization of numerous growth-reducing fiscal entitlements and transfer payments. De-
Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 1989. 
68 Between 1950 and 1970, the average rates of change were 1.0 percent for the whole-
sale price index, 1.8 percent for the GDP deflator, and 2.0 percent for the consumer 
price index. 
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spite these signs of danger, both foreigners and nationales were heavilly betting on the con-
tinued success of the Costa Rican economy. 
In sharp contrast, during the 1980s Costa Rica experienced major economic diffi-
culties. An economy that for over two decades had enjoyed rapid growth faced declining 
output and trade flows. The rate of growth of the GDP dropped from 8.9 percent in 1977 
to -7.3 percent in 1982. The decline of growth rates was shared by all sectors of economic 
activity and by all components of aggregate supply and demand. By 1982, fixed investment 
amounted to 49 percent, while imports represented 58 percent of their 1979 levels. Both 
exports and imports declined and the country's trade deficit, which had grown from US$ 92 
million in 1972, to US$ 522 million in 1980, had to be curtailed to US$ 23 million by 1982. 
Before the 1980s, Costa Rica had been successful in generating rapidly growing em-
ployment opportunities and in using its labor markets to distribute the fruits of growth. 
Costa Rica had been the country in Latin America with the highest rate of growth of em-
ployment in modem, non-agricultural activities.69 Factor-price policies had discouraged 
employment in the private sector, however, and the public sector had increasingly become 
the employer of last resort. Public-sector employment increased from 6 percent of the labor 
force in the early 1950s, to 20 percent in the early 1980s. The large size of some ministries 
(e.g., Education) and of several autonomous institutions had facilitated the creation of strong 
middle-class labor unions. While almost one-half of the public-sector workers were union-
ized by the late 1970s, the proportion was 10 percent for the total labor force. These unions 
69 Norberta Garcia and Victor E. Tockman, Acumulacion. Empleo y Crisis, Santiago: 
PREALC, 1985. 
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had negotiated public-sector wages well above those for equivalent occupations in the priv-
ate sector. 
With the crisis of the early 1980s, open unemployment rates at least doubled, from 
4.5 percent of the labor force in 1979, to 9.5 percent in 1982, while underemployment 
increased substantially. From one-digit rates in the late 1970s, inflation accelerated in the 
1980s. In 1981, the wholesale price index increased 65 percent and it rose another 108 per-
cent in 1982. Once fiscal control was regained, the rate of inflation declined to 8 percent 
in 1984. A sharp contraction of the real size of the financial system had resulted from the 
attempts to finance huge fiscal deficits with domestic bank credit. As a consequence of a 
declining level of output in the face of high inflation rates, by 1982 average real wages had 
dropped to 46 percent of their 1979 level. They still were at about two-thirds of that level 
by the end of 1984. Inflationary pressures had also resulted in the rapid devaluation of the 
domestic currency, from 8.57 colones per US dollar in late 1979 to over 65 colones per US 
dollar in mid-1982. After stabilization in 1984, it was impossible to go back to the fixed 
exchange rate system, in view of the continued large size of the public sector. Growth was 
jeopardized, in addition, by attempts to pay the accumulated public external debt, equivalent 
to over one-and-a-half times the GDP, and which the country could not service as originally 
contracted. 
Given the exceptional record of steady growth and price stability of the pre-boom 
period, the difficulties of the early 1980s may seem surprising. Major external shocks and 
unfortunate domestic policies adopted in response to the shocks separate, however, the two 
periods. The shocks were characterized for their multiplicity and complex interactions, 
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including two negative oil shocks, with a highly positive coffee boom in between, an unusual 
expansion of the country's access to international financial markets, followed by the move-
ment of real interest rates from negative to highly positive and by a suddent restriction of 
the terms and conditions for further access to those markets, as well as war and insurrection 
in Central America, which contributed to the breakdown of the CACM. 
The crisis cannot be explained solely by these external shocks, however. The difficul-
ties were rather the result of a combination of unfavorable long-term trends with these 
short-term circumstances.70 The structural determinants of the crisis reflected a contradic-
tion between the country's basic characteristics (a small domestic market, relative labor 
abundance, and very specialized natural resources) and features of the protectionist strategy 
of industrialization adopted in the late 1950s.71 High costs and distortions had resulted 
from the penalization of agriculture and the anti-export bias of the adopted trade policies. 
By the mid-1970s, these deficiencies of the strategy of development already required major 
policy reforms. In addition, political stability and democratic participation had contributed 
to the consolidation of a multitude of interest groups, to overconsumption, and to an in-
creasingly rigid deadlock of power shares. The accumulation of entitlements had added to 
the existing distortions, enlarged the public sector, and promoted bureaucratic controls and 
70 Victor Hugo Cespedes, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and Ronulfo Jimenez, Costa Rica 
frente ala Crisis. Politicas y Resultados, San Jose: Academia de Centroamerica, 
1990. 
71 Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Fear of Adjusting: The Social Costs of Economic Policies 
in Costa Rica in the 1970s," in Donald E.Schulz and Douglas H.Graham, eds. 
Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1984. 
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regulations. The decentralized agencies and state-owned firms had become pressure groups 
in their own right and claimed substantial shares of the available resources. 
The second-half of the 1970s were characterized by two highly positive external 
events. The negative impact of the first oil shock was soon dissipated at the onset of the 
coffee boom, with its ovetwhelming windfalls. Increased real incomes were further sup-
plemented by an unusual access to foreign savings, in a country used to attracting substantial 
flows of external capital. Commercial policy reforms were postponed and, instead of a re-
duction, the period was characterized by the accelerated expansion of the explicitly budgeted 
public sector and of the entitlements to implicit public sector transfers. When the negative 
shocks returned, by the tum of the decade, the Costa Rican economy was ill-prepared for 
the adjustments required. Substantial instability and a major impoverishment followed. 
Earlier sections of this paper have highlighted the contrasting behavior of the private 
and the public sectors during the coffee boom. While the private sector correctly inter-
preted the trade shock as temporary and proceeded to save most of the windfall income, the 
public sector treated the impact of the shock as a new, permanently higher level of income 
and celebrated this with a spending euphoria. The government, already an interventionist, 
welfare state, became a major entrepreneur via the activities of CODESA and gave little 
attention to the modification of tax structures or the mobilization of domestic savings 
through the financial system. 
Under the Oduber administration (1974-1978), CODESA, the public investment cor-
poration, became an instrument for the state's intervention in productive activities in direct 
competition with the private sector. CODESA's non-restricted access to Central Bank credit 
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became a major component of the deterioration of the public-sector finances. While in the 
early 1980s CODESA's enterprises used 18 percent of domestic credit, they contributed only 
1.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product and 0.3 percent of total employment. Between 
1976 and 1983 none of CODESA's subsidiaries ever made a profit, while the accumulated 
losses (2.059 million colones) represented 35 percent of all of their assets.72 Because CO-
DESA was not restricted by the political controls typical of government agencies or by the 
profit discipline of private firms, the agency became a factory of quasi-rents. The larger the 
project, irrespective of profitability, the greater its political visibility and the larger the rents 
created. The coffee boom facilitated (and financed) these activities. Similarly, the Oduber 
administration continued the initiatives of the earlier Figueres administration in creating 
new redistributive, welfare agencies, such as the family allowances program (Asignaciones 
Familiares), which promissed streams of future income transfers which were not sustainable 
beyond the coffee boom period. 
While the end of the coffee boom windfall, the deterioration of the country's inter~ 
national terms of trade with the second oil shock, and the world recession required a major 
adjustment of the Costa Rican economy towards the end of the decade, the new Carazo 
administration (1978-1982) found it difficult to bring the rate of growth of aggregate 
expenditures downwards to a level consistent with the new circumstances. Import capacity 
was curtailed by the reduction in export earnings and in private capital inflows due to 
political instability in Central America, but the required austerity encountered much political 
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opposition. The powerful manufacturing sector had become extremely dependent on 
imported inputs as a consequence of the prevailing structure of effective protection and was 
prepared to defend its entitlements. The strong public sector unions, on the other hand, 
were ready to block any attempts at fiscal control. Numerous organized groups struggled 
to maintain their standard of living, aided by the new government's expansionary credit 
policies. 
Based on a weak coalition, the Carazo administration did not oppose the efforts of 
the more powerful interest groups to avoid the direct impact of the adjustment. Rather, the 
authorities chose to postpone the adjustment by heavily borrowing abroad. Costa Rica's 
public external debt increased to US$ 3,419 by 1984, to become one of the highest external 
debts in the world, in per capita terms. The stock of accumulated fiscal deficits financed 
abroad eventually reached, however, the limit that foreign lenders were willing to accept. 
When capital inflows began to dry up, the authorities expanded domestic credit even more 
rapidly, in order to sustain the level of spending of the public sector at the levels it had 
become used to during the coffee boom. The resulting inflationary pressures led to the loss 
of the accumulated .stock of international monetary reserves and to additional borrowing 
abroad in order to replenish reserves. Once these reserves were exhausted and access to 
foreign funds ceased, domestic inflation accelerated. When the revenues from the inflation 
tax declined, as a result of currency substitution and other mechanisms of evasion, the 
private sector was crowded out from domestic credit portfolios. The proportion of domestic 
credit for the private sector declined from 81 percent in 1975 to 55 percent in 1982. This 
crowding out accentuated the decline in output. 
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As a result of the inability to undertake appropriate measures to reduce the fiscal 
deficit and of the fear to the political costs of an outright devaluation, exchange rate 
management became chaotic. Experimentation with all kinds of exchange rate practices, 
taxes and subsidies, import and exchange controls, prior deposits, and other policy instru-
ments reflected the weakness of the authorities and the strength of the interest groups. 
Major distortions in resource allocation and inequities in wealth distribution resulted. A 
large bureaucracy had to be hired at the Central Bank in order to administer the system, 
while numerous legal battles were the consequence of the complexity of contradictory 
regulations. 
The increased level of government expenditures and income transfers that resulted 
from the coffee boom was not sustainable over the long run. While there is a possibility 
that the authorities simply misjudged the size of the future foreign exchange flows and 
committed themselves to unsustainable consumption support programs, the bulk of the over-
expansion may be attributed to political economy pressures. Political stability and democrat-
ic participation had promoted the creation of entitlements to current and future income 
streams for a multitude of interest groups (industrialists, public sector workers, social 
security beneficiaries, small farmer borrowers, rice growers, and cattle ranchers). Given the 
legal formality of the Costa Rican system, such entitlements had been institutionalized as 
specific property rights. This institutionalization, in the form of revenue earmarking and 
legal spending requirements, had in turn reduced the discretionary powers of the authorities 
and had limited their flexibility to adjust to changes in the economic environment. In order 
to meet growing demands for services and transfers, new sources of revenues had to be 
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sought to support an ever increasing public sector. In addition, the predominant position 
of the nationalized banks in the financial system made it possible to easily direct domestic 
credit to the financing of public-sector activities and income transfers. 
With the coffee boom, a particularly large set of new programs and transfers had 
been created, but retrenchment looked politically costly when the boom was over. Social 
peace was perceived as being highly dependent on the preservation of entitlements to public 
sector services and income transfers. This not only made policy reforms difficult, but it also 
guaranteed that the impact of the crisis would be suffered the most by the politically least 
powerful segments of society. 
The experience of Costa Rica during the coffee-cum-debt boom highlights the need 
for cautious macroeconomic management during a positive temporary trade shock, although 
the incentives for such parsimony may not be there at such times, and it suggests that, given 
the interactions between the political economy pressures, the behavior of the authorities, 
and the availability of export windfalls or large flows of borrowed foreign funds, ample 
access to additional external resources may not always be welfare improving. 
During the early stages of the crisis, the reduction in the economy's real income 
necessitated the adoption of expenditure-reducing policies and measures to curtail the size 
of the fiscal deficit, but the authorities chose to transform the fiscal deficit into a foreign 
debt issue, by persuading foreign lenders to extend more credit, even in the absence of a 
consistent stabilization-cum-liberalization program. Foreign borrowing then became the cor-
nerstone of macroeconomic policy management. This approach was unfortunate. The de-
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cision to increase the foreign debt seriously compromised future growth for the sake of 
sustaining an artificial level of consumption for a few additional years. 
Access to foreign financing strengthened the reluctance to devalue, even when the 
colon had become grossly overvalued. This resulted in substantial implicit and explicit 
subsidies for those with access to the underpriced foreign exchange. The beneficiaries were 
not only those classes with a high import content in their consumption patterns, but par-
ticularly those who were able to transform a large portion of their portfolios of wealth into 
foreign assets. That is, public foreign borrowing and a fixed exchange rate that overvalued 
the domestic currency resulted in a subsidy to private capital flight for those with sufficient 
liquid resources to be able to speculate against the colon and for those for whom the tran-
sactions costs of foreign asset purchases were sufficiently low. The returns from externally 
borrowed resources were thereby privatized, while service of the foreign debt was socialized. 
Thus, while the beneficiaries of the postponement were those capable of investing abroad, 
the losers have been the marginal groups now deprived of public sector services in areas 
such as health and education. The shares in the burden of the adjustment responded, 
therefore, to the political and economic strength of the distribution coalitions of interest 
groups. 

